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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Adjoining Landowners-Lateral Support-Duty of Excavator.
Plaintiff and defendant were adjoining landowners in the city of
Greensboro, North Carolina. In laying a foundation for his building
defendant excavated below the foundation of plaintiff's building. Soft
soil, first discovered at a depth of twelve feet, began to run out from
plaintiff's land. Plaintiff's building settled and damages resulted. It was
held that defendant's failure to make a soil test in order to ascertain the
effect of the proposed excavation upon plaintiff's property as well as
ihe failure to give plaintiff proper notice amounted to negligence for
which defendant was liable.'
By the common law the owner of land in its natural state has an
absolute right to have his soil remain in its natural position.2 This right,
however, does not include that of having the contiguous land remain in
its natural state, but only the right to have the benefit of support. Con-
sequently, the authorities recognize that the neighboring landowner can
make excavations if artificial support is substituted to prevent the fall-
ing away of the adjoining land.8 If the excavating owner violates this
absolute right of lateral support he must respond in damages, 4 irrespec-
tive of negligence or want of skill, 5 or the distance of the excavation
from the adjoining land.6
The natural right of lateral support does not, however, give to a
landowner the right to place on his land additional weight, such as
buildings and other superstructures, and then claim additional lateral
support for the buildings beyond the support given his land in its
natural condition, since this would deprive the adjoining owner of the
IS. H. Kress and Co. v. Reaves, 85 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), Cert.
denied, 57 Sup. Ct. 322, 81 L. ed. No. 8 (Cum. Tab.). No statute was involved.
2I REEVES, REAL PROPERTY (1909) §206; I TIFFANY, REAL PaOPERTY (2d ed.
1920) §345; Trowbridge v. True, 52 Conn. 190 (1884); Shultz v. Bower, 57
Minn. 493, 59 N. W. 631 (1894); Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S. E.
1087 (1910). However, it appears that courts have generally held that a land-
owner has no right of lateral support as against a municipal corporation's right
to dictate the level of streets and can acquire none through the lapse of time.
DILLON, MuNIcnIAL CORPORATONS (1911) §1679. See also Radcliff's Ex'rs v.
Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195, 203 (1850) ; Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson,
192 N. Y. 54, 84 N. E. 578 (1908); N. Y. Steam Co. v. Foundation Co., 195
N. Y. 43, 87 N. E. 765 (1909).
'I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §345; Rector, etc., v. Paterson Ex-
tension Ry., 66 N. J. L. 218, 49 Atl. 1030 (1901); see also Stimmel v. Brown, 7
Hbust. 219, 30 Atl. 996 (Del. 1885).
" Gray v. Tobin, 259 Mass. 113, 156 N. E. 30 (1927); Neyman v. Pincus, 82
Mont 467, 267 Pac. 805 (1928) ; Prete v. Cray. 49 R. 1. 209, 141 Atl. 609 (1928).
'Chesapeake and 0. Ry. v. May, 157 Ky. 708, 163 S. W. 1112 (1914); Cooper
v. Altoona Concrete Construction and Supply Co., 53 Pa. Super. 141 (1913).
'Louisville and N. R. R. v. Colombo, 240 Ky. 102, 41 S. W. (2d) 672 (1931).
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proper and natural use of his land.7 In England and in many American
jurisdictions the owner may recover for the damage done to his build-
ings as well as to the land if the land without the added weight would
have fallen away as a result of the excavation on the contiguous soil.8
A few courts, however, tend to support the view that there can be no
recovery for damages to the buildings in the absence of negligence even
though the land would have fallen without the additional weight.9
Whether or not the land without the buildings would have fallen, the
modern view seems to be that the owner who excavates his land must
use ordinary care to protect buildings on the adjoining land and that
he is liable for damages if he is negligent. 10 The excavating owner,
however, is not a guarantor of the safety of the adjoining buildings
and he is not bound to exercise extraordinary care ;11 but a trespasser
digging on the supporting land is held to a higher standard of care than
the owner. 12 Failure to give timely and sufficient notice of a proposed
excavation;13 failure to excavate friable soil otherwise than in sec-
tions ;14 failure to ascertain in advance whether the proposed excavation
is likely to expose neighboring land with artificial additions to unreason-
able risk ;15 use of inadequate instrumentalities ;16 changing the method
I Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 25 L. ed. 336 (1878) ;
Moody v. McClelland, 39 Ala. 45 (1863) ; Ceffarelli v. Landino, 82 Conn. 126,
72 Atl. 564 (1909); Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220 (1815); Gilmore v.
Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (1877); Gildersleeve v. Hammond, 109 Mich. 431, 67
N. W. 519 (1896); Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S. E. 1087 (1910).
l Brown v. Robins, 4 H. & N. 186 (Ex. 1859) ; Attey Gen. v. Conduit Colliery
Co., 1 Q. B. 301 (1894); Langhorne v. Thurman, 141 Ky. 809, 133 S. W. 1008
(1911) ; Farnandis v. Great Northern R. R., 41 Wash. 486, 84 Pac. 18 (1906).
'Moellering v. Evans, 121 Ind. 195, 22 N. E. 989 (1889) ; Vandegrift v. Bow-
ard, 129 Md. 140, 98 Atl. 528 (1916); Weiss v. Kohlhagen, 58 Ore. 144, 113;
Pac. 46 (1911); Ulrick v. Dakota Loan and Trust Co., 2 S. D. 285, 49 N. W.
1054 (1891).
" Moore y. Anderson, 5 Boyce 477, 94 Atl. 771 (Del. 1915) ; Wigglesworth
v. Brodsky, 7 Boyce 586, 110 Atl. 46 (Del. 1920); Horowitz v. Blay, 193 Mich.
493, 160 N. W. 438 (1916) ; Diksajtsz v. Brosz, 104 Pa. Super. 246, 158 Atl. 620
(1932) ; Christensen v. Mann, 187 Wis. 567, 204 N. W. 499 (1925) ; RESTATEMENT
oF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1937) §1303.
u Canfield Rubber Co. v. Leary and Co., 99 Conn. 40, 121 Atl. 283 (1923);
Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S. E. 1087 (1910) .
" Jeffries v. Williams, 5 Ex. 792 (1850); Bibby v. Carter, 4 H. & N. 153(Ex. 1859) ; see also Finegan v. Eckerson, 26 Misc. Rep. 574, 57 N. Y. Supp. 605(1899).
1 Canfield Rubber Co. v. Leary and Co., 99 Conn. 40, 121 Atl. 283 (1923);
Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12, 42 Atl. 918 (1899) ; Gerst v. City of St. Louis,
185 Mo. 191, 84 S. W. 34 (1904) ; Schultz v. Byers. 53 N. J: L. 442, 22 At. 514(1891) ; Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S. E. 1087 (1910).
14 "Gildersleeve v. Hammond, 109 Mich. 431, 67 N. W. 519 (1891); Davis v.
Summerfield, 131 N. C. 352, 42 S. E. 818 (1902), relearing denied, 133 N. C.
325, 45 S. E. 645 (1903) ; see also Hammond v. Schiff, 100 N. C. 161, 6 S. E. 753
(1888).
" Bissel v. Ford, 176 Mich. 64, 141 N. W. 860 (1913); Canfield Rubber Co. v.
Leary and Co., 99 Conn. 40, 121 Atl. 283 (1923).
"Canfield Rubber Co. v. Leary and Co., 99 Conn. 40, 121 Atl. 283 (1923)(insufficient sheet piling).
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of excavating after notifying the adjoining owner that a certain method
was to be followed ;1' employment of incompetent workmen ;18 and main-
taining an excavation under such conditions or for such a length of time
as to expose adjoining land with buildings thereon to unreasonable risk
of harm,19 have been held to constitute negligence. When the excavator
has given due notice and has otherwise exercised due care, the duty
to take necessary precautions to provide proper support is generally
placed on the owner of the buildings himself.2 0
. Legislation has been enacted in many states in order to secure better
protection to the public and to define more specifically the relative rights
and duties of coterminous landowners. Statutes in a few states merely
require the excavator to give notice and to take reasonable precaution
to sustain the neighboring land, but the statutes say nothing about sup-
porting buildings.21 Others create new duties and require the excavator
to provide temporary support for adjoining buildings where the excava-
tion is to be made below a certain depth. 22
The court in the principal case holds that "due care" includes the
duty to make a preliminary soil test, and that the failure to exercise
this duty amounts to negligence. The only other case which the writer
has been able to find that imposed upon the excavator the duty of
making a soil test involved an excavation over a hundred feet in depth.23
In the principal case the defendant intended to dig only twenty feet
deep. The requirement of making soil tests whether the proposed exca-
vation be shallow or deep seems justifiable, particularly when applied
in urban centers where nearly all available space is used for building
purposes.
E. C. SANDERSON.
'Cooper v. Altoona Concrete Construction and Supply Co., 231 Pa. 557, 80
At. 1047 (1911); Collias v. Detroit and Northern Michigan Bldg. and Loan
Ass'n, 220 Mich. 207, 189 N. W. 866 (1922).
" Stockgrowers' Bank v. Gray, 24 Wyo. 18, 154 Pac. 593 (1916).
' Garvy v. Coughlan, 92 Ill. App. 582 (1901) (exposure to rain, snow and
freezing for three years) ; Bohrer v. Dienhart Harness Co., 19 Ind. App. 489, 49
N. E. 296 (1898) (blocking gutter so as to bring surface water into the excava-
tion) ; Hannicker v. Lepper, 20 S. D. 371, 107 N. W. 202 (1906) (exposure to
weathering); Lochore v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 265, 167 Pac. 918 (1917)(weathering).(wVandergrift v. Boward, 129 Md. 140, 98 Atl. 528 (1916); Obert v. Dunn,
140 Mo. 476, 41 S. W. 901 (1897); Eggert v. Kullman, 204 Wis. 60, 234 N. W.349 (1931).
2GA. CODE (1933) §85-1203; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §54-310; S. D. ComP.
LAws (1929) §361.
" CAL. CIVIL CODE (Deering, 1931) §832 (12 feet); MicH. Cmp. LAWS (1929)§§13500-13503 (12 feet); N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) §3926 (8 feet); OHIO CODE
Axx. (Throckmorton's, 1929) §§3782, 3783 (9 feet); PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936)
§53-5648 (to a depth below the bottom of existing wall).
Bissel v. Ford, 176 Mich. 64, 141 N. W. 860 (1913) ; see also Canfield Rubber
Co. v. Leary and Co., 99 Conn. 40, 121 Atl. 283 (1923).
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Conflict of Laws-Insurance--Service of Process.
Action was instituted by plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Missis-
sippi, upon a default judgment rendered by a County Court of the
State of Mississippi upon a policy of insurance issued as a result of the
solicitation of defendant's Mississippi agent, defendant being a North
Carolina corporation. It appeared from the Mississippi judgment that
at the time of the institution of the action in the courts of Mississippi,
defendant company was no longer doing business there and process was
served on it by service on the Insurance Commissioner under a
Mississippi statute requiring foreign insurance companies to appoint
the Insurance Commissioner as their attorney to accept service so long
as any liability of the company remained outstanding in the state.
Summons was also served on the resident agent who had represented
defendant company at the time the policy was issued. Defendant con-
tends that the Mississippi Court did not have jurisdiction because it was
not doing business in the State and had not appointed the Insurance
Commissioner its attorney to accept service. Held, for plaintiff. Defend-
ant was estopped to set up its noncompliance with the statute and it
was conclusively presumed to have complied with such statute.'
Under the well settled rule that a state has the power to exclude,
restrict or regulate foreign corporations, doing or seeking to do business
within its borders,2 statutes have been passed requiring the corporation
before doing business in the state to have an agent in the state upon
whom service of process may be had.3 More particularly, foreign insur-
ance companies, which may be regulated under the police power,4 must
designate some statutory agent such as the Insurance Commissioner to
accept service of process. 5 These statutes have been held valid6 and
I Dansby v. N. C. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 211 N. C. 120, 189 S. E. 122 (1937).
See also 209 N. C. 127, 183 S. E. 521 (1936).2 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168, 19 L. ed. 357 (1869) ; State of Wash. ex. rel.
Bond and Goodwin and Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court of Wash. for Spokane
County, 289 U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1256 (1932); Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wis., 247 U. S. 132, 38 Sup. Ct. 444, 62 L. ed. 1025 (1917)
(The business of insurance, as ordinarily conducted, is not interstate commerce,
and a state may absolutely exclude a foreign insurance company from doing
business within the state or may permit it to come within the state under such
restraints and regulations as the state may choose.) ; Fisher v. Trader's Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 217, 48 S. E. 667 (1904); Lunceford v. Commercial
Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 190 N. C. 314, 129 S. E. 805 (1935);
17 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CooRPORAIONS (Penn. ed., 1933) §§8386, n. 5, 8416, n. 3
(cases collected).
'18 FL.wcHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIO s (Perm. ed. 1933) §8697 (statutes collected
under footnote 54). As to jurisdiction of partnerships see Flexner v. Farson,
248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. ed. 250 (1918).
'German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L. ed.
1011 (1914) (Insurance business clothed with public interest and may be reg-
ulated under state's police power.); La Tourette v. McMasters, Ins. Comm'r,
248 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160, 63 L. ed. 362 (1919).
'Mississmi CODE ANN. §5165(3); N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6411.
'Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 Sup. Ct. 707, 47
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are said to become part of insurance policies.1 The limitations, condi-
tions, restrictions and burdens imposed by these statutes must of course
not infringe upon the rights accorded by the provisions of the Federal
or State Constitutions.8 In some types of situations the above men-
tioned statutes must, to be constitutional, require that the agent give the
foreign corporation notice of the service of process upon him.0 There
is a difference of opinion as to the effect of the failure of a foreign
corporation to appoint a designated state official its agent to receive
service of process.1 ° The most logical rule is found in those cases hold-
ing that when a foreign insurance corporation does business in a state
but fails to comply with the statute requiring the appointment of a
designated state official as its process agent, the corporation will never-
theless be bound by such service for all causes of action arising out of
business transacted within the state;" as in the principal case, but not
L. ed. 987 (1903); Biggs v. Mut. Reserve Fund Ass'n. 128 N. C. 5, 37 S. E. 955(1901) ; Moore v. Mut. Reserve Fund Ass'n, 129 N. C. 31, 39 S. E. 637 (1901) ;
Mut. Reserve Fund Ass'n v. Scott, 136 N. C. 157, 48 S. E. 581 (1904) ; 18
FIETcHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §8762, n. 97.
'Collier v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 119 Fed. 617 (D. C. Mass.,
1902); Am. Loan and Investment Co. v. Boraas, 156 Minn. 431, 195 N. W. 271(1923) ; Woodward v. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10
(1904).
'Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186, 7 Sup. Ct. 931, 30 L. ed. 915 (1887) ; Horn
Silver Mining Co. v. N. Y., 143 U. S. 305, 12 Sup. Ct. 403, 36 L. ed. 164 (1891)
(state cannot interfere with interstate or foreign commerce) ; So. Pacific v. Den-
ton, 146 U. S. 202, 207, 13 Sup. Ct. 44, 36 L. ed. 915 (1887) ; Hooper v. California,
155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct. 207, 39 L. ed. 297 (1895) ; (Thus a corporation can-
not be deprived of the right to enter a state and transact business therein, when
it has derived its existence from an Act of Congress, and is a lawful agency for
the performance of governmental or quasi-governmental functions.); Liggett v.
Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57, 73 L. ed. 204 (1928) ; Lacy v. Armour
Packing Co., 134 N. C. 567, 47 S. E. 53 (1904), aff'd, 200 U. S. 226, 26 Sup. Ct. 232,
50 L. ed. 451 (1905); State v. Agcy, 171 N. C. 831, 88 S. E. 726 (1916) ; Brust
v. First National Bank of Stevens Point, 184 Wis. 15, 198 N. W. 749 (1924) (Nat.
bank cannot be excluded) ; 17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933)
§8390, n. 32. (cases collected).
'State of Wash. ex rel. Bond and Goodwin and Tucker v. Superior Ct. of
Wash. for Spokane County, 289 U. S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L. ed. 1256, 89
A. L. R. 658 (1933) (Statute not invalid for failure to require state official to
give foreign corporation notice of service on him since foreign corporation could
have appointed its own agent.) ; Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 278 U. S.
559, 49 Sup. Ct. 17, 73 L. ed. 505 (1928) (Where a foreign corporation has done
business within the state in defiance of statutory conditions and then withdrawn,
it may be brought into court by service on a state officer only if the statute im-
poses a duty to notify.) ; Note (1933) 89 A. L. R. 658 (review of holdings).
" Rothrock v. Dwelling House Ins., 161 Mass. 423, 37 N. E. 206, 23 L. R. A.
863 (1894) (service on state official whom the statute requires to be designated
but who has not in fact been designated held insufficient to confer jurisdiction to
render judgment against the corporation); Mason's Frat. Acc. Ass'n v. Riley,
60 Ark. 578, 31 S. W. 148 (1895).
' Funk v. Anglo-Am. Ins. Co., 27 Fed. 336 (C. C. E. D. Mo., 1886) ; Knapp,
Stout and Co. v. Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Fed. 607 (C. C. E. D. Mo., 1887);
Sparks v. Nat. Masonic Acc. Ass'n, 100 Iowa 458, 69 N. W. 678 (1896) ; Kulberg
v. Frat. Union of Am., 131 Minn. 131, 154 N. W. 748 (1915) ; Braunstein v. Frat.
Union of Am., 133 Minn. 8, 157 N. W. 721 (1916); Richardson Machinery v.
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as to business transacted out of the state.12 This rule is based on the
theory that by doing business in the state the corporation is said to have
consented to jurisdiction,1 3 such consent being presumed ;14 or on the
theory that the corporation is estopped to set up its violation of the
statute.15 The consent that is said to be implied in such cases is of
course a mere fiction, justified by the accepted doctrine that the state
could exclude the foreign corporation altogether, and could, therefore,
establish this obligation as a condition to its admission to the state.16
By the great weight of authority under statutes similar to those
under discussion, the withdrawal of the corporation from the state
does not revoke the authority of the agent to receive service in an
action arising in the state out of business done by the corporation
therein 17 as the appointment of a state official is a power coupled with
an interest and, therefore, irrevocable.' 8 If this were not true the
corporation would be able to avoid jurisdiction and thus place a great
hardship upon those who had dealt with it. As was expressed in one
case, "the end sought to be attained [protection of those dealing with
the foreign corporation by providing statutory agent for receiving
service] would be as illusory as a will o' the wisp, which fleets when it
is sought to grasp it."'1 In addition to service upon a designated state
Scott, 122 Okla. 125, 251 Pac. 482 (1926) ; Conques v. La. Western Ry., 295 S. W.
935 (Tex. 1937).Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 208 U. S. 8, 28
Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. ed. 369 (1907).
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 (1855).14Knapp, Stout and Co. v. Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 30 Fed. 607 (C. C. E. D.
Mo., 1887) (service prima facie good); Flinn v. Western Mut Life Ass'n, 187
Iowa 507, 171 N. W. 711 (1919) (conclusive presumption).
"
2North Am. Union v. Oliphant, 141 Ark. 346, 217 S. W. 1 (1919) ; Erhman
v. Teutonia Ins. Co., 1 Fed. 471 (1880) (The receipt of the premium and execu-
tion and delivery of the policy 'by the company are equivalent to an assertion that
it has complied with the requirements of the statute to entitle it to do business
in the state, and, as between the assured and the company, the latter is estopped
upon the soundest principles of the law and morals to say that it has not done
so.) ; Fisher v. Traders' Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 217, 48 S. E. 667 (1904)
17 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §8520, n. 36.
"Lafayette Ins. Co., v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451 (1855).
' Woodward v. Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 178 N. Y. 485, 71 N. E. 10 (1904);
Biggs v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 5, 37 S. E. 955 (1901)
Hinton v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 135 N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474 (1904);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §93; Note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 1447;
18 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1933) §8762 (excellent treat-
ment of the problem).
"Moore v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 129 N. C. 31, 39 S. E. 637 (1901)(Exception to general rule that agency may be revoked recognized in that agency
irrevocable when coupled with an interest, or where it is contractual in its na-
ture, given for a consideration and for the protection of someone, or some in-
terest.) ; Frazier v. Steel and Tube Co. of America, 101 W. Va. 327, 132 S. E.
723 (1926). The objective seems to be to give the insured a feeling of security
as to an adequate remedy on his policy.
" Biggs y. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 6, 7, 37 S. E. 955, 956
(1901).
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official, the former agent of the company which has withdrawn may be
served with process so as to bind the foreign corporation, where the
matter in controversy arose out of business transacted in the state by
the corporation prior to its withdrawal.2 0 This is to prevent the mis-
carriage of justice through efforts of the corporation to withdraw and
thus avoid jurisdiction. 21
North Carolina requires of foreign insurance companies as a condi-
tion precedent 22 to doing business in the state that they give the
Insurance Commissioner an irrevocable power of attorney so long as
any liability of the company remains outstanding in the state.23 If this
requirement is not complied with, service may be had as in the case of
other corporations.2 4
The full faith and credit provision of the Constitution does not
prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which a judg-
ment offered in evidence was rendered. 25 By the weight of authority,
however, the foreign judgment is conclusive on collateral attack except
for want of jurisdiction or fraud.2 6 As to judgments rendered by the
courts not of record of another state the earlier cases held that such
judgments were not conclusive on the merits, 27 but it is now generally
settled that such judgments, when properly proved and when jurisdic-
tion is shown to have existed, are entitled to full faith and credit in
other states, and are as conclusive as the judgments of a court of
record. 28
Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 Sup. Ct. 707.
47 L. ed. 987 (1903); Fisher v. Traders' Mut. Life Ass'n, 136 N. C. 217, 48
S. E. 667 (1904) ; FLETCHER, PIVATE CORPORArONS (Pern. ed. 1933) §8761. n. 67.
2 Brown-Ketchan Iron Works v. Swift Co., 53 Ind. A. 630, 100 N. E. 584
(1913).
2 Biggs v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 128 N. C. 5, 37 S. E. 955 (1901).
2 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Scott, 136 N. C. 157, 48 S. E. 581(1904); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)§6411.
' Hinton v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 135 N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474, 65
L. R. A. 161 (1904); Fisher v. Traders' Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 217, 48
S. E. 667 (1904); Brenzier v. Supreme Council, Royal Arcanum, 141 N. C. 409.
53 S. E. &35, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 235 (1906) ; Pardue v. Asher, 174 N. C. 676, 94
S. E. 414 (1917) ; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935)§§483, 1137 (service on for-
eign corporations).
'Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897 (1873). To the same ef-
fect: Mottu v. Davis, 151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969 (1909).
'Lewis v. United Order of Good Samaritans, 182 Ark. 914, 33 S. W. (2d) 53
(1930).
'Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 624 (1880); Warren v. Flagg, 2 Pick. 448 (Mass.
1824).
'Helton v. Turner, 153 So. 866 (Ala. 1934) (In action on a judgment on note
rendered by Tenn. justice of the peace court, the courts of Ala. are bound to
presume that the Tenn. court legally possessed jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter upon which it professed to adjudicate, until the contrary is made to appear.) ;
Glass v. Blackwell, 48 Ark. 50, 2 S. W. 257 (1886); Banister v. Campbell, 138
Cal. 455, 71 Pac. 504 (1903) ; Baltimore and Ohio Ry. v. Freeze, 169 nd. 370, 82
N. E. 76 (1906); Matter of Curtis, 134 App. Div. 547, 119 N. Y. Supp. 556(1909), aff'd 197 N. Y. 583, 91 N. E. 1111 (1910).
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Some courts say that all facts essential to jurisdiction must appear
on the face of the record or be shown by competent evidence before the
adjudication can be accepted as binding and conclusive. 29 Other courts
go so far as to hold that foreign judgments may be attacked for want
of jurisdiction, even though jurisdictional facts are recited therein.30
In determining the question of jurisdiction of the parties in the foreign
judgment, courts have made use of certain presumptions 31 which are
relied upon only in the absence of evidence or averments respecting the
facts presumed.32 Such presumption of jurisdiction may be either
rebuttable 3 or conclusive.34 In the absence of a presumption the
burden of proving want of jurisdiction is on the defendant pleading
it.35 If the record of the judgment shows on its face that the court
rendering it did not have jurisdiction, the judgment will not be recog-
nized by the courts of other states.3 6 Neither will there be a presump-
tion of jurisdiction if the judgment is in proceedings which are special
and statutory and not according to the course of the common law.3
Once the jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit and the person
of the defendant are obtained, it will be presumed that jurisdiction
continued to the judgment in the absence of evidence to the contrary.38
It has been held that a direct adjudication by the courts of one state
21 Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 21 L. ed. 959 (1873) ; Helton v. Turner, 153
So. 866 (Ala. 1934) ; Toler v. Coover, 335 Mo. 113, 71 S. W. (2d) 1067 (1934);
Fox Vilet Drug Co. v. Arnold, 84 S. W. (2d) 1012 (Tex. 1935).
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 37 Sup. Ct. 492, 61 L. ed. 966
(1917) ; Drummond v. Lynch, 82 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Dyke v. Ill.
Commercial Men's Ass'n, 358 Ill. 458, 193 N. E. 490 (1935); Mottu v. Davis,
151 N. C. 237, 65 S. E. 969 (1909); Bonnett-Brown Corp. v. Coble, 195 N. C.
491, 142 S. E. 772 (1928) ; Fisher v. March, 26 Grat 765 (Va. 1875).
' Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A.,
4th, 1935).
n Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 21 L. ed.,.959 (1873).
' McAlister v. McAlister, 214 Ala. 345, 107 So. 843 (1926) (jurisdiction
prima facie in absence of showing on face of properly certified transcript of want
of jurisdiction) ; Makorios v. Green Co., 256 Mass. 598, 153 N. E. 11 (1926).
'Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 615, 155 So. 205 (1934)
(Unless the contrary appears from the record, all jurisdictional facts are con-
clusively presumed to have existed, whether there be recitals in the record to
show them or not, and this rule applies, although the judgment attacked was
rendered by default, or constructive service of process alleged to be defective.
Presumption conclusive on collateral attack; and on direct attack, the defendant
must affirmatively show that the defect existed as a matter of fact.). But cf.
Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 127 (1925) (the jurisdiction of the
court of the first instance over the parties and subject matter must affirmatively
appear).
" Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A.
4th, 1935); Miller v. Brown, 170 Ark. 949, 281 S. W. 904 (1926); Rodenbeck
v. Crews State Bank and Trust Co., 97 Ind. App. 21, 163 N. E. 616 (1928).
'Holland v. Universal Life Co., 180 AtI 328 (Del. 1935); Old Wayne Mut.
Life Ass'n v. Flynn, 31 Ind. App. 473, 68 N. E. 327 (1903) ; Smith v. Central
Trust Co., 154 N. Y. 333, 48 N. E. 553 (1897).
" Holland v. Universal Life Co., 180 Adt. 328 (Del. 1935) (substituted service
statute involved).01 Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531, 16 Sup. Ct 366, 40 L. ed. 525 (1896).
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that the court which rendered a certain judgment had the requisite
authority and that the parties were legally brought before the court is
conclusive on the question and is not open to collateral attack.39 Mere
irregularities cannot be set up against the judgment when brought in
question in another state4 0 but it is well settled that the defense may be
interposed that the judgment was obtained by fraud.4 '
The principal case follows the weight of authority. The defendant
not having shown lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the procurement of
the judgment could not overturn it. Defendant was estopped to show
lack of jurisdiction by setting up its own violation of the statute requir-
ing it to designate the Insurance Commissioner as its attorney to accept
service.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Local Laws-Regulation of Professions-
Real Estate Brokers.
In 1868 the General Assembly of North Carolina was given consti-
tutional power to tax trades and professions.1 In 1899 the first license
tax was placed on real estate dealers. 2 A tax on this trade for the
purpose of raising revenue has continued to the present 3 and paying
this has been the only state-wide legal requirement for engaging in the
real estate business.
In 1927 an act 4 was passed which made the qualifications for
obtaining a license in eight counties depend upon the applicant's ability
to show to the satisfaction of a Real Estate Commission his reputation
for honesty and fair dealing and his competency to transact the business
in such a manner as to safeguard the public.5
This statute was held unconstitutional in State v. Warreno on the
ground that it was local in effect, applying to but eight counties, and
was thus discriminatory and in violation of the right to equal protection
of the laws. Had the act been applicable to the whole state, the majority
opinion implies that it would have been a valid use of the police power.
'Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628 (1893); Citizens' Nat.
Bank v. Consolidated Glass Co., 83 W. Va. 1, 97 S. E. 689 (1919).
'Drummond v. Lynch, 82 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
" Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1890);
Jaster v. Currie, 198 U. S. 144, 25 Sup. Ct. 614, 49 L. ed. 998 (1904) ; Cannon v.
Howell, 131 N. C. 125, 42 S. E. 555 (1902); Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 448,
55 S. E. 371, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 905 (1906) ; Mottu v. Daniels, 151 N. C. 237,
65 S. E. 969 (1909) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 152 N. C. 731, 68 S. E. 240 (1910); Ring
and Wellborn v. Whitman, 194 N. C. 544. 140 S. E. 159 (1927); Bonnett-Brown
Corp. v. Coble, 195 X. C. 491, 142 S. E. 772 (1928).
2N. C. CoNST. art. V, §3. 2 P. L. N. C. 1899, c. 2, §50.
3 P. L. N. C. 1935, c. 371, §100. 'Public-Local Laws 1927, c. 241.
The act likewise provided eleven causes for which the license might be sus-
pended or revoked.
0211 N. C. 75, 189 S. E. 108 (1937).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The effect of the decision is that the state can set character and pro-
fessional qualifications for all real estate brokers and salesmen, but
cannot regulate only a part as the sale of real estate is state-wide and
can be regulated only by general laws which affect every county.
It was not specifically stated which constitutional provisions were
violated by the act. It was condemned because it was not state-wide
and because it was discriminatory. The North Carolina Constitution
prohibits local legislation relating to trade;7 therefore, if the regulation
of real estate men so as to insure honesty and business capability can be
classed as a regulation of the real estate trade, then perhaps the legis-
lation was invalid under this constitutional provision. But the court did
not refer to the provision. If the court thought that the act in question
did contravene the prohibition, no doubt it would have been indicated.
Therefore, we turn to the second objection to the act.
The giving of exclusive emoluments or privileges is forbidden by
the North Carolina Constitution ;8 the taking of life, liberty or property
without due process are forbidden by both the North Carolina Consti-
tution9 and the Fourteenth Amendment; denial of equal protection of
the laws is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. These are doubt-
less the constitutional prohibitions which the court had in mind when it
said that the act was unconstitutional because discriminatory. An exami-
nation of the cases involving local laws wherein discrimination or lack
of due process was urged shows three classes of attempted regulations
under the police power. First, when the matters regulated were of such
a nature that local sentiment and circumstances were mainly responsible
for the enactment, the test for determining whether discrimination
existed has been whether the act equally affected all within the territory
defined in the act. 10 When the police power was invoked to require
Indian children to attend school longer than white, a warning was
sounded when two dissenting justices argued that this law was an
invalid departure from the constitutional requirement of uniformity
in all the essentials of the school system." Uniformity here meant
uniformity throughout the state. Second, in the field of criminal law,
the court said in condemning a local law making the killing of cattle
7 N. C. CoNsr. art II, §29.
8 N. C. CoNsT. art. I, §7. IN. C CoNsT. art. I, §17.
"'Local liquor laws held constitutional because locally uniform: State v. Muse,
20 N. C. 463 (1839) ; State v. Barringer, 110 N. C. 525, 14 S. E. 781 (1892) ;
State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 506 (1905). Local laws regulating dogs
held constitutional: State v. Blake, 157 N. C. 608, 72 S. E. 1080 (1911) (citing
cases involving local laws on many subjects) ; Newell v. Green, 169 N. C. 462, 86
S. E. 291 (1915). Local law relating to the use of profanity on the property of a
certain mill in one county upheld: State v. Warren, 113 N. C. 683, 183 S. E. 498
(1893). The disposition of cotton in three counties regulated: State v. Moore,
104 N. C. 714, 10 S. E. 143 (1889).
"State v. Wolf, 145 N. C. 440, 59 S. E. 40 (1907).
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by a railroad in certain counties a misdemeanor that an act divested of
any peculiar circumstances and per se made indictable should be equally
and uniformly indictable throughout the state.'12 However, it was not
pointed out in this case, or in a majority of the others, what part of
the constitution was violated. Third, when under the guise of a police
regulation, agents in certain counties were required to pay a thousand
dollar license fee before hiring laborers to work outside the state, the
court held such fee to amount to a tax on a vocation and void for lack
of uniformity required of taxes on trades or professions.' 3 It was
pointed out that the legislature in exercising police power, as the term
police power is commonly interpreted, is not restrained by the consti-
tutional provision for uniformity. (Uniformity here presumably means
uniformity throughout the state.)
An examination of the legislation regulating other trades and
professions discloses that these laws have been all-inclusive in territorial
scope. Without doubt, this fact had great weight with the court in the
instant case. 14
" State v. Divine, 98 N. C. 778, 4 S. E. 477 (1887); State v. Fowler, 193
N. C 290, 136 S. E. 709 (1927) (A law applicable to five counties limiting the
punishment for the first offense of violating the prohibition law to a fine, hel a
grant of special exemption, an arbitrary class distinction.).
'State v. Moore, 113 N. C. 697, 18 S. E. 342 (1893) (N. C. CoNsr. art. V, §3
authorizes a tax on trades and professions, and although it is not expressly pro-
vided that such tax shall be uniform, yet a tax not uniform would be inconsistent
with other sections of the constitution. See Worth v. Wilmington and Weldon
R. R., 89 N. C. 291 (1883); Dalton v. Brown, 159 N. C. 175, 75 S. E. 40 (1912)(An act levying a tax on lumber hauled 'by any lumber company using the public
roads of a certain county was held to be a legitimate police regulation for the
maintenance of the roads. A strong dissent urged that since the act did not apply
to private individuals or other heavy haulers, the tax was void for lack of uni-
formity.) ; State v. Bullock, 161 N. C. 223, 75 S. E. 942 (1912) (Where the tax
applied to all in the county 'who hauled 'heavy materials, it was unanimously held
non-discriminatory.). The following cases involve acts or ordinances enacted
under the police power, but do not exactly fit into the three categories set out in
the text. Plott Co. v. Ferguson Co., 202 N. C. 446, 163 S. E. 688 (1932)(An act applicable to Buncombe County which sought to prescribe a
greater measure of liability upon a bond of indemnity than was imposed in the
other ninety-nine counties was held burdensome and discriminatory.); Edgerton
v. Hood, Comm'r of Banks, 205 N. C. 816, 172 S. E. 481 (1934) (An act provid-
ing that depositors in closed banks in certain counties might sell their claims to
debtors of the bank and that the bank should accept such claims at face value in
payment of debts was held to be a discrimination against debtors and creditors
of closed banks in other sections of the state.) ; State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C. 644,
175 S. E. 142 (1934) (A municipal ordinance requiring operators of vehicles for
hire to deposit with the city treasurer policies of liability insurance or cash or
securities was held void as creating a monopoly and a turning of 'business over
to a privileged class since personal sureties were not allowed.).
1" State v. Van Doran, 109 N. C. 864, 14 S. E. 32 (1891) (doctors) ; State v.
Call, 121 N. C 643, 28 S. E. 517 (1897) (doctors); State v. Hicks, 143 N. C.
689, 57 S. E. 441 (1907) (dentists) ; State v. Siler, 169 N. C. 314, 84 S. E. 1015(1915) (osteopaths) ; State v. Scott, 182 N. C. 865, 109 S. E. 789 (1921) (ac-
countants); State v. Lockey, 198 N. C. 551, 152 S. E. 693 (1930) (barbers);
Roach v. Durham, 204 N. C. 587, 169 S. E. 149 (1933) (plumbers); N. C. CoDE
ANx. (Michie, 1935) §5259(1)-(29) (cosmetologists).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The 1937 General Assembly evidently believed that by following
existing interpretations of the constitutional prohibition against local
laws,15 that is, by the procedure of enacting a general law and excepting
the counties that did not wish to require by law a showing of honesty
and business capability from the real estate men, the odium of the
previous law, held unconstitutional in the principal case, could be
avoided. The 1937 Real Estate License Act,' 6 which embodies the
previous act almost word for word, is undoubtedly a general law, but
it is not necessarily a state-wide law since 48 counties are excepted
from its provisions. 17
The 1937 act may be valid so far as the constitutional prohibition
against local laws is concerned, granting that the prohibition is appli-
cable at all to real estate dealing as "trade". The act might have been
held not to violate this prohibition if it had originally been made to
apply to all the counties except ninety-two, instead of to eight counties.
It would not be a praiseworthy result, however, to hold that a law
applicable to counties A, B, and X is invalid, whereas a law applicable
to all counties excepting every county but A, B, and X is valid. Legal
formalism is justly condemned when the form serves no purpose.
But even though the legislature has framed the new act to avoid
possible violation of the prohibition against local legislation, the objec-
tion that the act is discriminatory is as forceful as ever. If the court
adheres to its position that such regulation of the real estate business
is a matter of state-wide, not local, concern, it is hard to see how the
new act can escape the fate of the old, since real estate men in
forty-eight counties do not have to meet the requirements of the act.
18
WILLIAM THORNTON WHITSETT.
' In 1917 the North Carolina Constitution was amended, N. C. CoNsT. art. II,
§29 prohibiting local laws in fourteen enumerated fields. Under this provision
in distinguishing between general laws and local acts the court has gone so far
as to hold that though the constitution prevented local legislation relating to
bridges and ferries, an act which created in one county a commission for the build-
ing of bridges was valid. Huneycutt v. Comm'rs of Stanly County, 182 N. C.
319, 109 S. E. 4 (1921). It held that an act to be condemned as local must direct
the construction of a particular bridge at a specific spot. Day v. Comm'rs of
Yadkin and Surry counties, 191 N. C. 780, 113 S. E. 164 (1926). Likewise, the
court held that a law was no less general because a number of counties were ex-
cepted from the act. In re Harriss, 183 N. C. 633, 112 S. E. 425 (1922) (though
forty-four counties were excepted from the law establishing courts inferior to
the Superior court, this was held to be a general law and as such valid despite
the prohibition against local legislation in this field.). Spruill, The Proposed Con-
stitution and Special, Private, and Local Legislation in North Carolina (1933)
11 N. C. L. REv. 140.
P1 .L. N. C. 1937, c. 292, §§1-17%. P7 . L. N. C. 1937, c. 292, §173/2.
"In spite of the dicta -by the North Carolina court in the principal case to the
effect that a state-wide law regulating those engaged in the real estate business
would be upheld, there are grounds for arguing that legislative control in this
occupation is too wide an extension of the police power. The court quotes with
approval from Rawles v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 292, 279 S. W. 350, 352 (1925)
which held a state-wide regulation of the real estate trade unconstitutional. "'If
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Constitutional Law-Minimum Wage Legislation.
In a recent comment in this Review the cases involving the consti-
tutionality of minimum wages were reviewed.' In a 5-4 decision in
April, 1937 the United States Supreme Court reversed itself on the
question.2 Taking judicial notice of "the unparalleled demands for
relief which arose during the recent period of depression and still
continue to an alarming extent, ' 3 the Court expressly overruled the
Adkins case 4 and upheld a Washington statute regulating minimum
wages for women and children.
The condemning feature of previous minimum wage statutes in that
they looked at only one side of the employment contract was not
entirely absent from the Washington case.5 Notwithstanding this objec-
tion heretofore sustained, the Court justified the act as a proper exer-
cise of the state police power.6 The majority recognized that the need
for protection of women by minimum wage legislation outweighed all
arguments as to denial of due process. "The Constitution," Chief
Justice Hughes wrote, "does not speak of freedom of contract.... And
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted
in the interests of the community' 7 is not an unreasonable restraint
on that liberty of which no one may be deprived without due process.
Moreover, the health and morals of our women employees are suffi-
ciently close to public interest to justify legitimate protection; minimum
wage requirements afford an "admissible means to that end." 8
occasional opportunity for fraud is to be the test, then there is no reason why
every grocer, every merchant, every automobile dealer . . .and every mechanic
who deals more frequently with the public in general and whose opportunities
for fraud are far greater than those of the real estate agent or salesman, may
not be put on the same basis. . . .The result will be that all . .. who fail to
establish their moral fitness will not only be deprived of their means of liveli-
hood, but will become a burden .. .on .. . the community at large. . . . Fit-
ness on the part of the real estate broker, ... is a thing greatly to be desired,
but ...we shall have to leave something to religious and moral training, to
public opinion, and to the ordinary laws of the land.'"
(1936) 15 N. C. L. REv. 50.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 455
(1937).3 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 585, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 455, 463.
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1922).
rThe Washington statute requires the employer to pay a wage "sufficient
for the decent maintenance" of the woman worker, thus apparently imposing
an obligation to pay irrespective of the value of the services as did the District
of Columbia law which required the minimum wage to be sufficient to supply
"the necessary cost of living." See (1936) 15 N. C. L. REV. 50, 51.
, "The statute now before us is like the latter (speaking of the District of
Columbia law) but we are unable to conclude that in its minimum wage re-quirement the State has passed beyond the boundary of its broad protective
power." West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 584, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op.
455, 461.
" 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 581, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 455, 458.8 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 585, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 455, 462.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In an attempt to distinguish its position from that adopted in the
recent New York case 9 the majority stated that no application was made
there for a reconsideration of the constitutional question involved in the
Adkins case. The sole question ruled on by the Court in the New York
case was whether the case was distinguishable from the Adkins case.'0
If the Court had so desired, it could have avoided the effect of the
technical holding in the New York case and reconsidered the funda-
mental constitutionality of minimum wages. This question was pre-
sented the Court in October, 1936 in a petition to rehear the New York
case. The Court, however, denied the rehearing."
In a powerful dissent apparently aimed at the entire New Deal
Administration and criticising the majority for their change of policy,
Justice Sutherland declared the "judicial function is that of interpre-
tation; it does not include the power of amendment under the guise of
interpretation... If the Constitution ... stands in the way of desirable
legislation, the blame must rest on the instrument and not upon the
Court for enforcing it according to its terms. The remedy in that
situation . . .is to amend the Constitution."'12 In the judgment of the
minority, minimum wage legislation cannot be a reasonable exercise of
the state's police power.
In upholding the Washington law, much emphasis was placed on
the point that "woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence," thus necessitating legislative protection.13 Although this
case represents a reversal by the Court on the fundamental issue, there
still remains open the question of constitutionality of a general minimum
wage law applicable both to men and women.
0. W. CLAYTON, JR.
Constitutional Law-North Carolina
Unemployment Compensation.
"In September, 1935, the Alabama Unemployment Compensation
Law was enacted, and later amended in April, 1936.1 This Act pro-
'Morehead v. People of New York, 298 U. S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed.
1347 (1936).
" Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1922), cited supra note 4.
n Morehead v. People of New York, 57 Sup. Ct. 4, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 65
(1936).
" West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 587, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op.
455, 465.
' 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 583, 81 L. ed. Ad. Op. 455, 460. This same argument as
to woman's physical structure has been advanced to uphold other laws regulating
their employment. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. ed.
551 (1908).
1 GEN. AcTs Ax. 1935, p. 950; GEN. AcTs ALA. 1936, Ex. Sess., pp. 176, 225,
228.
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vides that employers of eight or more employees must pay approxi-
mately two-thirds of the contributions to be paid by employers and
employees out of payrolls to a general fund for benefits to unemployed.
Two actions were instituted by employers to obtain injunctions against
the collection of these contributions. The Act was assailed as unconsti-
tutional both under the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and under the Alabama Constitution. A three-
judge Federal District Court held the Act unconstitutional. The Court
found that arbitrarily classifying only employers having eight or more
employees as within the Act was a denial of due process and equal
protection of the law; and that the requirement that employers pay
about two-thirds of the contributions to the general fund for the benefit
of the unemployed with no direct benefit to themselves violated the
provisions of the Alabama Constitution.2 In a five-four decision this
has been reversed by the United States Supreme Court.2-
The Federal Social Security Act3 makes provisions for unemploy-
ment compensation, but leaves its actual operation and the numerous
details connected therewith to the states under their own laws.4 The
North Carolina Legislature at a special session enacted the North
Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law in December, 1936.5 Like
the Alabama Act the law only applies to employers of eight or more0 ,
and certain types of employment are excluded from the Act.7 Employ-
ers pay contributions in relation to their payrolls,8 which go into a
IGulf States Paper Corp. v. Carmichael; Southern Coal and Coke Co. v. Same,
17 F. Supp. 225 (M. D. Ala. 1936). The Supreme Court of Alabama has held the
Act constitutional. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 174 So. 516 (Ala. 1937).
This is a final adjudication upon the latter ground relied upon by the federal district
court in the principal case. Similar statutes in other states have been held constitu-
tional. Gillum v. Johnson, 62 P. (2d) 1037 (Cal. 1936) ; Howes Brothers Co. v.
Massachusetts U. C. Comm. 5 N. E. (2d) 720 (Mass. 1936); W. H. H. Chamber-
lin, Inc. v. Andrews; E. C Stearns and Co. v. Same: Associated Industries of N. Y.
State, Inc. v. Department of Labor of N. Y., 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22
(1936), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court, AMr. Justice Stone not
participating, 57 Sup. Ct. 122 (1936).
The sections of the Federal Social Security Act dealing with unemployment
compensation have been held constitutional in Chas. C. Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937), affirming 89 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). The
Federal Act is not considered in this note.
2 Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co.; Carmichael v. Gulf States
Paper Corp., 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (1937).
$49 Stat. 620 (1935), 42 U. S. C. A. §§301-1305 (Supp. 1936).
"The provisions of the 90 per cent credit device make it highly desirable for
states to enact laws in conformity with the Federal Act. 49 Stat. 639 (1935), 42
U. S. C. A. §1102 (Supp. 1936).
P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1. See p. 377, supra.
Old. §19(f) 1.
7Employment by the Federal Government, State, or any of its political sub-
divisions; employment as agricultural labor; as domestic servants; employment
in navigation; family employment; and employment by religious, charitable, sci-
entific, literary, or educational organizations. P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1,
§19(g)7.
80.9 per cent, 1936; 1.8 per cent, 1937; 2.7 per cent, 1938 and thereafter.
P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §7(b).
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pooled fund.9 No contributions are required of employees.' 0 Benefits
do not become payable until January 1, 1938.11
Like the Alabama Act the North Carolina Act will stand the test of
constitutionality. Under its police power a state may levy taxes for the
general welfare. "An ulterior public advantage may justify a compara-
tively insignificant taking of private property for what in its immediate
purpose is a private use."1 2 The contributions may well be considered
"not a penalty but an industrial cost charged to those who control the
profits of industry, who can adjust it, absorb it, and pass it on in in-
creased prices to the consuming public which ultimately benefits and ulti-
mately pays for it."'' 3 Cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation
Laws furnish a close analogy. 14 The inevitable injuries incident to the
operation of industry are a matter of great public concern, and the public
should bear the cost.' 5 Both the Workmen's and Unemployment Com-
pensation Laws impose liability on the employer regardless of any
wrongful act on his part-one for compensation for injuries and death
suffered in the course of employment; the other for injuries suffered
from the lack of employment. They both impose new liabilities, shift a
risk to business, look primarily to the protection of the wage-earner,
and apply only to employers employing a certain number of persons.16
' Separate employer accounts are maintained for each employer for bookkeep-
ing purposes only. P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §7(c)1. No provision is
made for merit rating, that is, assessing employers according to their unem-
ployment records, but the Act appoints a commission to study and report to the
1939 Legislature on the advisability of merit rating and/or an employer reserve.
system. Id. §7(c)3.
10 The Act does not mention employee contributions, but does expressly pro-
vide that the employers' contributions shall not be deducted in whole or in part
from the wages of employees. P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §7(a) 1.
"P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §3(a).
'Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 187, 55
L. ed. 112, 116 (1911) ; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. ed.
923 (1885) ; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676, 49 L. ed. 1085 (1905) ;
Offield v. New York, N. H. and H. R. R., 203 U. S. 372, 27 Sup. Ct. 72, 51 L. ed.
231 (1906) ; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 27 Sup. Ct. 289, 51 L. ed. 499 (1907) ;
Nicchia v. New York, 254 U. S. 228, 41 Sup. Ct. 103, 65 L. ed. 235 (1920) ; Mc-
Glone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688 (1908).
"Epstein and Crary, Constitutiontal Aspects of the State Unemployment Insur-
ance Law (1936) S N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'r BULLETIN 215, 220.
"4 New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed.
667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255, 61 L. ed. 678
(1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260,
61 L. ed. 685 (1917) ; Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct.
553, 63 L. ed. 1058 (1919). It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of
the United States has sustained all forms of state compensation laws that have
come before it. McGovNEY, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1930) 766, n. 59.
"It is reasonable that the public should pay the whole cost of producing
what it wants, and a part of that cost is the pain and mutilation incident to pro-
duction. By throwing that loss upon the employer in the first instance we throw
it upon the public in the long run, and that is just" Arizona Copper Co. v. Ham-
mer, 250 U. S. 400, 433, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 561, 63 L. ed. 1058, 1072 (1919).
" See Rice, A Note on the Constitutionality of State Unemployment Compensa-
tion Laws (1936) 3 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 138, 141; Legis. (1935)
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However, the Unemployment Compensation Law goes further than
the Workmen's Compensation Laws. The former imposes a liability
where none existed before. The latter supplanted the pre-existing
liability imposed by the common law, thus providing a consideration for
the substituted liability.1 Still they do impose a substantial new burden
by imposing liability regardless of fault.' 8 Under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Laws there is a causal connection between the employment
and the injury, since compensation is payable only if the injury arose
out of and in the course of the employment. However, by more efficient
management industry, meaning both the individual employer and all
employers working as a group, could decrease unemployment to a
minimum, just as more efficient management decreases injuries to a
minimum. 19
The Workmen's Compensation analogy is buttressed by a long line
of comparable cases. The Bank Deposit Guaranty Fund Cases20 upheld a
statute which assessed every state bank a certain percentage of its aver-
age daily deposits to protect the depositors of banks which became in-
solvent. This was held not a violation of due process. The Sheep Dog
cases21 held that a statute, which exacted contributions from all dog
owners to compensate owners of sheep injured or killed by dogs, irre-
spective of whose particular dog had created the loss, did not violate the
police power. Yet, in each of these groups of cases the parties were
assessed without regard to any wrongful act on their part for the benefit
of another group.
The Act does not involve denial of equal protection, because it
applies only to employers employing eight or more persons, and ex-
empts certain types of employers. The legislature has a wide discretion
in selecting where the cost shall fall. The fact that it discriminates in
favor of certain classes does not render its action arbitrary if the dis-
10 ST. Jo Hx's L. Rrv. 147, 154-155; (1936) 4 GEo. WAse. L. REv. 498, 500-502;
(1928) 25 GEORGETOWN L. J. 467, 469.
"' New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 201, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 252,
61 L. ed. 667, 674 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219,
234, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 263, 61 L. ed. 685, 694 (1917); Jacobson, The Wisconsin
Unemployment Compensation Law (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 420, 477; (1936) 21
MINN. L. Rtv. 97.
See Hughes, C. J., dissenting in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R.,
295 U. S. 330, 383, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 777, 79 L. ed. 1468, 1494 (1935).
See Rice, A Note on the Constitutionality of State Unemployment Compensa-
tion Laws (1936) 3 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 138, 147-148; (1936) 4
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 498, 502-503.
:'Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112(1911).
ICole v. Hall, 103 Ill. 30 (1882) ; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind. 62 (1866)
McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688 (1908); People v. Van Horn,
46 Mich. 183, 9 N. W. 246 (1881); Longyear v. Buck, 83 Mich. 236, 47 N. W.
234 (1890); Holst v. Roe, 39 Ohio St. 340 (1883) ; Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. 317
(1862) ; Tenny v. Lenz, 16 Wis. 566 (1863).
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crimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction or if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived to support it.22 Only where the
classification is wholly capricious or unreasonable will it be said that it
denies equal protection.2 3 To make the Act apply to all employers
would require such a large and complicated administrative machinery
as to defeat its very purpose. Exempting certain types of employers,
regardless of the number employed, is a provision long familiar to legis-
lative enactments. 24
Requiring employers with little or no unemployment to contribute
to a fund to help those who become unemployed, and at the same rate
as those employers having a great deal of unemployment, is not
a valid ground for attack on the Act. There is ample authority to
support the pooled fund features of the Act. The central pooling of
funds has been approved in -the Workmen's Compensation cases,2 -5
the Head Money cases,206 the Sheep Dog cases,2 7 and the Bank Deposit
Guaranty Fund Cases.28 Although individual employers may in many
cases do much to stabilize employment in their industries, there are
many factors over which they have little control. Today most in-
dustries are interdependent. A slack period in business in one indus-
'American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43,
45 L. ed. 102 (1900) ; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 22 Sup. Ct.
616, 46 L. ed. 872 (1902); New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152,
27 Sup. Ct. 188, 51 L. ed. 415 (1907); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59,
32 Sup. Ct. 192, 56 L. ed. 350 (1912); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571,
35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. ed. 364 (1915); Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co., 240
U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 L. ed. 679 (1916) ; State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v.
Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 75 L. ed. 1248 (1931).
1 Bell's Gap R.R. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup.
Ct. 533, 33 L. ed. 892 (1890) ; Connelly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540,
22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. ed. 679 (1902) ; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S.
412, 40 Sup. Ct. 560 64 L. ed. 989 (1920); Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v.
Day, 266 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12, 69 L. ed. 169 (1924) ; Louisville Gas and E. Co.
v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 48 Sup. Ct. 423, 72 L. ed. 770 (1928).
' Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389
(1911); Brushaber v. Union P. R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. ed. 493
(1916); New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61
L. ed. 667 (1917) ; Middleton v. Texas Power and L. Co., 249 U. S. 152, 39 Sup.
Ct. 227, 63 L. ed. 527 (1919).
'Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61
L. ed. 685 (1917).
' These cases approved a tax on every alien entering the United States, the
tax to be paid by the owner of the vessel bringing such alien. The fund so cre-
ated was used for the relief of indigent aliens. Edye v. Robertson; Cunard
Steamship Co. v. Robertson, 112 U.' S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 28 L. ed. 798 (1884).
ISee Note 21, .rupra.
' Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112
(1911). Other cases of this type are: Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299,
13 L. ed. 996 (1851) (vessels not taking a pilot on entering or leaving port re-
quired to pay half pilotage into a fund for the relief of indigent pilots and their
dependents) ; Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct.
169, 68 L. ed. 388 (1924) (income of railroads in excess of a fair return required
to be paid into a fund to aid other roads in need of funds) ; State v. Cassidy, 22
Minn. 312 (1875) (tax on saloon-keepers to create a fund for the establishment
and maintenance of an institutiQn for inebriates).
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try, which may or may not be seasonable, affects other industries, often
causing greater unemployment in these than in the one directly affected.
These interlocking forces make it only just to place the burden indis-
criminately on industry as a whole. The pooling of funds would seem
to be the most feasible method for making unemployment compensation
effective.
One of the most formidable obstacles to the Act, according to the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland, is Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton R. R.,29 which declared the Railroad Retirement Act30
unconstitutional. This Act treated all employers as a single employer,
requiring those with a small amount of superannuation to contribute
the same percentage of their payrolls to a common pension fund as
did those with a greater amount. 31 The Supreme Court found that this
was not consistent with due process. However, this Act is distinguish-
able from the Unemployment Compensation Act. It contained cer-
tain retroactive provisions which are not present in the latter Act
which is wholly prospective in its nature. For example, some, but not
all, railroads had employees over the retirement age fixed by the Act,
and those carriers who had no such employees were thus forced to
contribute immediately to pensions for the employees of others.3 2 Also,
there is a fundamental difference between pensions and unemploy-
ment compensation: The pension payments were to be based upon
ages, wages, and length of service, all possible of determination with
mathematical exactness so that the proportionate share of each car-
rier might have been fixed. On the other hand, unemployment, being
due to a combination of causes, does not lend itself to mathematical
exactness. It is a problem of industry as a whole. In contrast, super-
annuation can be attributed to individual carriers. Also, the Court
found -that pensions did not reasonably tend to improve interstate com-
merce, while the Unemployment Compensation Act is enacted under
the police power of the State.33
The unemployment compensation laws are attempts not only to
prevent so far as possible, but also to make adequate preparation for,
any recurrences of economic depressions. The economic grounds for
2295 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468 (1935).
"48 Stat. 1283-1289 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §§201-214 (Supp. 1936).
The Court expressly distinguished Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S.
104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. ed. 112 (1911); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washing-
ton, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685 (1917); and Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169, 68 L. ed. 388 (1924),
which would seem to indicate that the Court is not opposed to a pooling of funds
when properly used.
'In contrast, no benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Act are
-payable until one year after the Act has gone into effect, and the amount of ben-
efits is based on services rendered after the enactment of the Act by persons upon
whose wages contributions have been paid.
'P. L. N. C. Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1, §2.
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such legislation are overwhelmingly forceful. "Here we are dealing
simply with the power of the Legislature to meet a growing danger
and peril to a large number of our fellow citizens, and we find nothing
in the act itself which is so arbitrary or unreasonable as to show that
it deprives any employer of his property without due process of law
or denies him the equal protection of the laws."'3 4
C. M. IVEY, JR.
Contracts-Duress-Business Compulsion
Plaintiff's policy of life insurance, with defendant company, included
the customary total and permanent disability clause, with waiver of
premiums after proof of disability. Plaintiff, alleging total and per-
manent disability, claimed the installments due him under the contract.
Defendant, denying the disability, insisted on the continued payment
of premiums by plaintiff in order to keep the policy in force. Plaintiff
paid the premiums under protest and brought this action to recover
the installments and premiums paid. A verdict in the trial court allowed
plaintiff to recover the disability installments and the premiums paid
under protest, with interest. The appellate court in reversing stated
that money paid voluntarily under protest cannot be recovered in the
absence of fraud, duress, or mistake.'
In determining the case the court apparently disregarded an impor-
tant though comparatively recent innovation in the law-the doctrine
of economic compulsion2 as a species of duress.
Anciently, duress in law could exist only where there were such
threats as would put one in fear of injury to life, limb, or liberty-
duress of person.3 Changing economic conditions brought about an
expansion of the concept of duress. The doctrine of duress of goods
evolved. This meant that a payment made to release one's property
from an unlawful seizure or retention was made under duress.4 Further
' W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews; E. C. Stearns and Co. v. Same; As-
sociated Industries of N. Y. State, Inc. v. Department of Labor of N. Y., 271
N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 26 (1936).
1 Ignatovig v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 16 F. Supp. 764 (M. D. Pa.
1935).
' The terms "economic compulsion," "business compulsion," and "moral duress"
are used interchangeably by the courts.
' "... it is to be known, that a man shall avoid his deed for manuas (menaces)
of imprisonment, albeit he were never imprisoned: for a man shall avoid his
own act for manuas in four cases, viz., 1. for fear of loose of member, 2. loose
of life, 3. of mayhem, and 4. imprisonment; otherwise it is for fear of battery,
which may be very slight, or for burning of his house, or taking away or de-
stroying his goods, or the like, for there he may have satisfaction by recovery in
damages." 2 Co. Inst. 483; Baily v. Devine, 123 Ga. 653, 51 S. E. 603 (1905).
'Lonergan v. Buford, 148 U. S. 581, 13 Sup. Ct. 684, 37 L. ed. 569 (1893)
(oppressive refusal to deliver cattle under contract); Cobb v. Charter, 32 Conn.
358 (1865) (mechanic's tools were withheld depriving him of a means of sup-
port); Du Vail v. Norris, 119 Ga. 947, 47 S. E. 212 (1904) (money paid to police
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relaxation of the law has led to the modern doctrine of business
compulsion.
The typical fact situations to which this doctrine applies may be
described roughly as follows: to protect himself against serious eco-
nomic loss, a party is coerced into paying a sum of money which he
does not owe. 5 The payment may be of a sum greater than is due,0
or payment may be made where nothing is owed to the party exercising
the coercion. 7 This doctrine of economic or business compulsion clearly
expands the older category of duress of goods in that here no property
is withheld by the coercing party. Rather does one in a position of
power merely take undue advantage of the economic plight of his
adversary to extort a payment which is not only involuntary, but is not
legally owed. This pressure exerted by the strong against the weak is
felt to destroy the free volition which is a prerequisite to the existence
of a valid contract.8
The doctrine, in terms of duress or of economic compulsion,o has
attained judicial recognition in a substantial number of states.' 0
Still in its infancy, the doctrine of economic compulsion already
off cer to secure stolen ring); Fenwick Shipping Co. v. Clark, 133 Ga. 43, 65
S. E. 140 (1909) (payment to prevent seizure of baggage); Berger v. Bonnell
Motor Co., 4 N. J. Misc. 589, 133 Atl. 778 (1926) (wrongful withholding of auto-
mobile 'by garage after repairing it) ; Ferguson v. Associated Oil Co., 173 Wash.
672, 24 P.(2d) 82 (1933) (refusal to deliver gasoline under contract whereby
plaintiff was forced to pay excessive amount or suffer loss of his lease) ; Astley
v. Reynolds, 2 Strange 915 (K. B. 1732) (withholding of plaintiff's plate by
pawnbroker); WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRAcTs (1913) §216; (1934)
8 WASH. L. REv. 140. Contra: Karschner v. Latimer, 108 Neb. 32, 187 N. W.
83 (1922) (,where proof of damage and great hardship was required before the
payments could be recovered).
'Rowland v. Watson, 4 Cal. App. 476, 88 Pac. 495 (1906) ; City of Chicago
v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 218 Ill. 40, 75 N. E. 803 (1905) ; Pitts-
burgh Steel Co. v. Hollingshead, 202 Ill. App. 177 (1916); Bates v. New York
Ins. Co., 3 John's Cas. 238 (N. Y. 1802); Kilpatric v. Germania Life Ins. Co.,
183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124 (1905); Homecrest Bldg. Co. v. Weinstein's Es-
tate, 165 N. Y. Supp. 176 (1917) ; Harris v. Carey, 112 Va. 362, 71 S. E. 55
(1911); York v. Hinkle, 80 Wis. 642, 50 N. W. 895 (1891); Guetzkow Bros. v.
Breese, 96 Wis. 592, 72 N. W. 45 (1897) ; (1932) 20 VA. L. REv. 474. Contra:
Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N. C. 369, 67 S. E. 913 (1910). Where plaintiff was in
possession of real property under a land contract and had paid an excessive
amount to defendant in fear of losing improvements, held recovery denied.
' Kilpatric v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 183 N. Y. 163, 75 N. E. 1124 (1905).
'Ramp Bldgs. Corp. v. Northwest Bldg. Co., 164 Wash. 603, 4 P.(2d) 507
(1931).
, "This kind of duress consists in imposition, oppression, undue influence, or
the taking of undue advantage of the business or financial stress or the extreme
necessities or weakness of another, whereby his free agency is overcome." Pitts-
burgh Steel Co. v. Hollingshead, 202 Ill. App. 177, 178 (1916).
'Earlier cases read in terms of duress-Harris v. Carey, 112 Va. 362, 71 S. E.
551 (1911). More recent cases adopt the term "economic compulsion". Criterion
Holding Co. v. Cerussi, 250 N. Y. Supp. 735 (1931). Contrast also majority and
concurring opinions in Ramp Bldgs. Corp. v. Northwest Bldg. Co., 164 Wash.
603, 4 P.(2d) 507 (1931).
" See cases cited supra note 5 and also cases collected (1931) 79 A. L. R. 655.
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involves difficult problems as to when a payment is, or is not, voluntary.
Payment under protest alone is not considered involuntary,-' This is to
prevent the rule from operating as a boomerang, inviting proof that a
payment was under protest when it in fact was not.12 The courts will
not consider the mere demand for payment sufficient compulsion to
constitute duress; another element must be present-proof that advan-
tage was taken of the economic stress of the payor. This later element
is essential to the existence of undue coercion.' 3
What is, or is not, improper coercion was a fundamental and para-
mount problem in cases involving the traditional concept of duress;
it remains a problem as to economic compulsion. For example, the
earlier cases held that there was no duress unless the threatened acts,
if actually committed, would be either illegal or tortious.14 Modern
decisions generally hold that a threat to do that which one has a legal
right to do may still constitute improper pressure if the free. will of
the other party is overcome. 15 Thus a mere threat to breach a contract,
in the absence of other circumstances, has never been treated as a basis
of duress ;16 but under the doctrine of economic compulsion where such
a threat is accompanied by an injury to the business of the threatened
party, for which his legal remedies are inadequate, such a threat may
constitute improper pressure.
17
2"Detroit v. Martin, 34 Mich. 170 (1830) ; Congdon v. Preston, 49 Mich. 204,
13 N. V. 516 (1882) ; Warren v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 198 Mich. 342, 164 N. E.
449 (1917) ; Stanford v. U. S. Investment Corp., 272 S. W. 568 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
"There would be a danger in holding otherwise in that any man in doubt as
to the validity of his payment could pay with a feigned protest and later sue
to recover the amount ... " Hicks v. Levett, 19 La. App. 836, 838, 140 So. 276,
277 (1932).
"Thus, "where an unfounded or illegal demand is made upon a person, and
the law furnishes him adequate protection against it or gives him an adequate
remedy, and instead of taking the protection the law gives him. . . , he pays what
is demanded, such payment is deemed to be voluntary and not compulsory pay-
ment." 48 C. J. 753, quoted with approval in Edwards v. Williams, 93 S. W.(2d) 452, 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
" Martin v. New Rochelle Water Co., 42 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1896) aff'd 162
N. Y. 599, 57 N. E. 1117 (1900); Charlotte Bank and Trust Co. v. Smith, 193 N. C.
141, 136 S. E. 358 (1927).
" Bither v. Packard, 115 Me. 306, 98 AtI. 929 (1916) ; Welch v. Beeching, 193
Mich. 338, 159 N. W. 486 (1916) ; see also Durfee, Recovery of Money Paid Un-
der Duress of Legal Proceedings (1917) 15 MicH. L. Rav. 228.
"
8 Mason v. U. S., 17 Wall. 67, 21 L. ed. 564 (1872); U. S. v. Nederlandsch-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschoppiy, 252 U. S. 148, 41 Sup. Ct. 72, 65 L. ed.
193 (1920); Hartsville Oil Mill v. U. S., 271 U. S. 43, 46 Sup. Ct 389, 70 L. ed.
822 (1926); Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N. W. 511 (1881); Doyle v.
Trinity Church, 133 N. Y. 372, 31 N. E. 221 (1892).
'
7 Hazelhurst Oil Mill and Fertilizer Co. v. U. S., 42 F.(2d) 331 (Ct. of
Claims, 1930). (The government, by refusing to accept goods for which it
contracted with plaintiff, would cause a drastic fall in the price of cotton linters
of which the plaintiff had a large quantity. By threat of such refusal the govern-
ment procured a settlement. If plaintiff had not settled, but had sued for breach
of contract, the damages would have been inadequate; therefore the court elimi-
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Another problem frequently raised is that of promptness of action
after the removal of the duress. The courts have held that even if there
is duress, it is necessary that the payor seek his remedy immediately
after the pressure under which he acted is removed.' 8 Though the
courts require "immediate" action, in fact the question of promptness
of action seems to be one of reasonable time, varying with the circum-
stances of the individual case.
There appears to be an important exception to the doctrine. In the
case of a tax paid under valid protest there can be no recovery unless
there was immediate danger of seizure of person or property.19 Thus
in this instance only, the older concepts of duress of person and of
goods seem to have undergone no stage of expansion. Generally how-
ever, the law of duress has made marked growth to date, and is even
now in a state of great development.
As applied to insurance cases, the doctrine has been generally
invoked where the prerequisite facts have been present,20 and there
appears to be no authority for the proposition that the doctrine is not
applicable to cases of insurance. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
California v. McCaskill2 ' is a case squarely in point. This recent case,
involving a fact situation identical with that of the principal case,
reaches a directly contrary result, the court allowing the plaintiff to
recover his payments to the insurance company on the basis of economic
compulsion.
While the principal case might have been decided differently on
the theory of unjust enrichment, 22 the facts fit more coherently into the
scheme of economic compulsion. The jury verdict, which allowed the
plaintiff to recover, established the fact that he was permanently and
totally disabled at the time he filed his claim for the installments;
therefore the company made illegal demands in regard to the continued
payment of premiums; the plaintiff in fear of losing his property. viz.,
nated the settlement on the ground of economic compulsion, and allowed the
plaintiff to recover on the basis of the original contract.).
I Deibel v. Jefferson Bank, 200 Mo. App. 506, 207 S. W. 869 (1919) ; Oregon
Pacific Ry. v. Forrest, 128 N. Y. 83, 28 N. E. 137 (1891) ; White v. Little Co., 118
Wash. 582, 204 Pac. 186 (1922).
"City of Morganfield v. Walker, 202 Ky. 641, 261 S. W. 12 (1924); Beno-
line Oil Co. v. State, 122 Ohio St. 175, 171 N. E. 33 (1930) ; Phoebus v. Manhat-
tan Social Club, 105 Va. 144, 52 S. E. 839 (1906); see Field, Recovery of It-
legal Taxes (1932) 45 HAv. L. Rzv. 501. Consideration must be given to the
statutory exemptions which provide for refund regardless of whether there is a
protest, if there is an overpayment.
I Bates v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 3 John's Cas. 238 (N. Y. 1802) ; City of Chicago v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 218 Ill. 40, 75 N. E. 803 (1905) ; Rosenfeld
v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 222 Mass. 284, 110 N. E. 304 (1915). The doctrine
is approved in Warren v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 198 Mich. 342, 164 N. W. 449
(1917) ; however, recovery was denied on the basis of insufficient -protest.
170 So. 579 (Fla. 1936).
'"WooDWORn, THE LAW OF QUAsi-CONMACTS (1913) §§l, 8, 115-124.
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the benefits of the policy, complied \vith the wrongful demands. The
result reached by the court might possibly be justified by treating the
threat to cancel the policy as a threat to breach a contract, such a threat
having been held not to constitute duress ;23 however, in order to sustain
this reasoning it must appear that the plaintiff's action on the contract
of insurance would adequately compensate him 24 and that he would
suffer no loss pending the time of the trial of his cause in the event
that he should ultimately lose the case.
At any rate, it seems that the court should have considered the
doctrine of economic compulsion; and there' is little justification for
deciding the case on a rule of law 25 which is at most questionably appli-
cable, since the payment of the premiums can scarcely be considered
voluntary. 26
JOHN TAYLOR SCHILLER.
Insurance-Burial Associations-Definition of Insurance.
Defendant funeral home was enjoined from doing an insurance
business without complying with the insurance laws.1  Thereafter
defendant sold contracts for $50, payable in monthly installments, which
provided that the purchaser would be rendered certain funeral services
on death, and that the purchaser's representative would be entitled
to funeral merchandise at reduced prices. There was a further stipula-
tion that the exercise of the privileges under the contract would render
the unpaid balance due and collectible. Contempt proceedings were
instituted by the Insurance Commissioner. Held: Since no element of
risk was involved the agreements were not insurance contracts and
defendant did not violate the injunction in making sales subsequently
thereto.2
Statutory definitions of insurance are ordinarily couched in such
general terms as to be of little value. North Carolina has one of the
more widely accepted definitions: "A contract of insurance is an
agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay
money or its equivalent or to do some act of value to the insured upon,
and as an indemnity for, the destruction, loss, or injury of something
See note 16 supra.
See note 17 supra.
" ... money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts cannot be re-
covered back except where it was paid under duress, fraud, or mistake." (Italics
the writer's). Ignatovig v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 16 F. Supp. 764(M. D. Pa. 1935).
'A settlement of the case was subsequently made. For a recent discussion of
this subject see (1937) 3 U. OF PrrSBuRGH L. Ray. 241.
' South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 60, 184 S. E. 875 (1936).
' South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 188 S. E. 529 (Ga. 1936).
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in which the other party has an interest."' The broad generalities of
the definition are obvious.
Though there is a perplexing problem as to what constitutes insur-
ance, all insurance contracts necessarily contain the following elements :4
"(1) One party possesses an interest susceptible of pecuniary estima-
tion". This insurable interest requirement is based on public policy
which condemns as a mere wager any agreement for insurance on any-
thing in which the parties have no interest. "(2) That interest is subject
to some well-defined peril or perils, the happening of which will destroy
or impair it, thereby causing loss to the risk bearer." A contract which
might otherwise be held insurance is likely to be called an executory
sales agreement where there is no element of risk. "(3) There is an
assumption of this risk by the other party to the contract." Insurance
is primarily considered as a risk-shifting device. "(4) The contract
for assuming the risk must be an integral part of a general scheme
for distributing a loss that may be suffered by any individual interest
owner among a considerable group of persons exposed to similar perils.
(5) The insured must make a ratable contribution, called a premium,
to the general insurance fund."5
However the fact that the above elements are present in a particular
instance is not conclusive. The courts in addition devise and apply
other tests.
One frequest test is control. This is ordinarily applied in regard
to indemnities accompanying sales of goods. If the happening of the
risk is within the control of the vendor, then the courts hold that the
contract is not insurance. Or stated differently, if the warranty includes
hazards other than defects in articles sold, it is insurance. Thus a con-
tract to repair plate glass windows and to replace them if broken from
any cause is an insurance contract because the breakage is beyond the
control of the repairer ;6 a contract to furnish mercantile reports which
guarantees their accuracy is not insurance since the credit company
can control the accuracy of its reports ;7 an organization which pays
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6262. At least 10 other states have almost
the identical statute, including Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington. Other states have
adopted definitions for particular branches of insurance. For example, GEORGrA
CODE (1933) §56-901, "A life insurance policy is a contract by which the insurer, for
a stipulated sum, engages to pay a certain amount of money if another shall die
within the time limited by the policy. The life may be that of the insured or of
another in the continuance of'whose life the insured has an interest."
'VANCE, INsURA cE (2d ed. 1930) §5.
'The presence of elements 4 and 5 distinguishes an insurance contract from an
ordinary guaranty or warranty. An ordinary suretyship contains elements 1, 2,
and 3 but is not considered insurance.
'People v. Standard Plite Glass and Salvage Co., 174 App. Div. 501, 156 N. Y.
Supp. 1012 (1916). But cf. Moresh v. O'Regan, 120 N. J. Eq. 534, 187 Atd. 619
(1936) ; People v. Roschli, 291 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1936).
People ex re. Daily Credit Service Corp. v. May, 162 App. Div. 215, 147
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benefits to its members on marriage is not engaged in the insurance
business as there is no risk outside the control of its members.8
Another test imposed is that of the purpose of the contract. Where
benefits, predicated on the occurrence of an event, are but incidental
to the main purpose of a contract, the transaction is not insurance.
Thus, a contract of a hospital to care for a patient the remainder of her
life for a stated sum is not ultra vires as an insurance agreement ;9 an
indemnity promise accompanying the sale of lightning rods is not
insurance, as the guaranty is incidental to the sale ;10 a contract of a
brewing company guaranteeing the payment of rent by a saloon-keeper
is incidental to the saloon-keeper's contract to sell only the brewing
company's beer;"' also employee relief funds made up from the
employee's wages and administered by the employer are not insur-
ance ;12 nor is an employer's contract to protect employees from violence
by strikers an insurance contract.13
However many courts do not apply the purpose of the contract test
and construe incidental benefits within the definitions of insurance. A
sale of furniture on the installment plan with a provision that the
balance of the installments due would be cancelled in case of death of
the purchaser before final payment was held to be insurance.14 Building
and loan associations which contract for extinguishment of a debt in
case of death of the debtor have been held to be dealing in insurance. 1
A promise by a newspaper to pay a sum to the estate of any person
accidentally killed with a copy of such newspaper in his possession was
held an insurance contract and therefore ultra vires of the publishing
company.16
Concerns organized with the purpose of dealing in risks, or conduct-
ing a business or offering a line of service founded on risk, are almost
uniformly declared to be insurance companies. Burial associations
N. Y. Supp. 487 (1914), aff'd 212 N. Y. 561, 106 N. E. 1039 (1914). But cf.
Ops. Att'y Gen. (N. Y. 1921) 235.
8 Chafart v. Payton, 91 Ind. 202 (1883) ; State v. Towle, 80 Me. 287, 14 Atl.
195 (1888); cf. White v. Equitable Nuptial Ben. Union, 76 Ala. 251 (1884);
Garratt v. Baker, 5 Cal. (2d) 745, 43 P. (2d) 828 (1935), rev'd 56 P. (2d) 225(1936).
'Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis v. Guillaunmes Estate, 222 Ill. App.
543 (1921).
" Cole Bros. and Hart v. Haven, 7 N. W. 383 (Iowa, 1880).
u James Eva Estate v. Mecca Co., 40 Cal. App. 515, 181 Pac. 415 (1919).
" Colaizzi v. Pa. Ry., 208 N. Y. 275, 101 N. E. 859 (1913); State ex. rel.
Sheets v. Pittsburgh, C, C. and St. L. R. R., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N. E. 93 (1903).
'Hansen v. Dodwell Dock and Warehouse Co., 100 Wash. 46, 170 Pac. 346(1918).
' Att'y Gen. v. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144 N. E. 371 (1924), (1924) 24
CL. L. REv. 802, (1924) 23 MICH. L. REv. 191.
"United Security Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Bond, 16 D. C. App. 579 (1900);
State v. Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N. W. 472 (1902).18 Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 463 (1882).
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which offer burial services for periodic payments are ordinarily sub-
jected to insurance regulations. 17 Various attempts to camouflage the
real nature of the business under the guise of a service organization
have been of no avail. Thus, automobile associations offering con-
tingent accommodation services and legal aid,' 8 title guaranty com-
panies, 9 realty corporations guaranteeing the value of auctioned land,20
a crop insurance company disguising its contracts as sales options,21
and physicians' defense associations, 22 have all been deemed insurance
companies.
A third test is termed the necessity of regulation. Is the company
of such a type that it should be subjected to insurance regulation?
Although this appears to be one of the most satisfactory standards, the
problem has been approached in this manner in only a few instances.
Benevolent associations are not considered insurance companies because
of their philanthropic objects although the usual insurance elements are
present.28 Ordinarily annuity contracts are not considered insurance
because they provide for periodic receipts in consideration of the pay-
ment of a lump sum to begin at the inception of the contract.
2 4 Yet
annuity contracts are regulated as insurance in some jurisdictions so
as to assure the company's ability to pay.25 Although an ordinary
" State v. Wichita Mutual Burial Ass'n, 73 Kan. 179, 84 Pac. 757 (1906);
Oklahoma Southwestern Burial Ass'n v. State, 135 Okla. 151, 274 Pac. 642
(1929); State v. Mutual Mortuary Ass'n, 166 Tenn. 260, 61 S. W. (2d) 664
(1933); State ex. rel. Reece v. Stout, 16 Tenn. App. 10, 65 S. W. (2d) 827
(1933) ; cf. State v. Gooch, 165 Tenn. 97, 52 S. W. (2d) 143 (1932) ; N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6476(z); P. L. N. C. 1937, c.239, commented on in this
R-viEw.
"Allin v. Motorist's Alliance of America, 234 Ky. 714, 29 S. W. (2d) 19
(1930) ; State v. Spauldini, 166 Minn. 167, 207 N. W. 317 (1926) ; State v. Bean,
193 Minn. 113, 258 N. W. 18 (1934) ; National Automobile Service Corp. v. State
55 S. W. (2d) 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214
Pac. 667 (1923) ; People v. New York Title and Mortgage Co., 346 Ill. 278, 178
N. E. 661 (1931). Accord: Wilson v. Louisville Title Co., 244 Ky. 683, 51 S. W.
(2d) 971 (1932).
1 Commonwealth v. Fidelity Land Value Assurance Co., 312 Pa. 425, 167 AtI.
300 (1933). But cf. People v. Potts, 264 Ill. 522, 106 N. E. 524 (1914). Contra:
Saltzman v. Fairbanks Realty Co., 145 Misc. 478, 260 N. Y. Supp. 334 (1932).
'lin re Hogan, 8 N. D. 301, 78 N. W. 1051 (1899).
'Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912);
Physicians' Defense Co. v.-O Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N. W. 396 (1907). Contra:
Vredenburgh v. Physicians' Defense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906) ; State ex. rel.
Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St 90, 76 N. E. 567 (1905).
'Fischer v. American Legion of Honor, 168 Pa. 279, 31 Ati. 1089 (1895);
Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n of Chicago v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99, 26 Atl. 253
(1893) ; Comm. ex. rel. Att'y Gen. v. Equitable Benefit Ass'n, 137 Pa. 412, 18
Atl. 1112 (1890) ; cf. Peterson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 244 Ill. 329, 91 N. E.
466 (1910).
' Rischel v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 78 F. (2d) 881 (C. C. A.
10th, 1935); Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 Ore. 32, 28 P. (2d) 875
(1934).
'For example, MAss. LAws ANN. (1933) c. 175, §118. Applied in Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 227 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 469 (1917).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
surety is not considered as an insurer, when a company makes a busi-
ness of suretyship it may be subjected to insurance law to protect the
public. 26
Thus it may be seen that predictability as to whether a company will
be held to be engaging in insurance is a rather complex problem.
Contracts of private27 undertaking establishments which offer future
burial services and sell funeral merchandise in consideration of install-
ment payments (depending on the longevity of the buyer) present a
fertile field for the insurance tests. Analytically, an application of the
control test would necessitate a finding that the contract is insurance,
since the risk is beyond the control of the undertaker. The necessity of
regulation test would lead to the same result, since the undertaker's
ability to perform should be safeguarded. However, the risk element is
merely incidental to the main purpose of the contract, to promote busi-
ness. Hence, the purpose of the contract test would lead to an opposite
conclusion. Since most of the contracts fit the broad statutory definitions
of insurance and contain the elements of an insurance agreement, the
private undertaking establishments are usually subjected to insurance
regulation.2 8
In the instant case29 the defendant cleverly evaded insurance regula-
tion by removing from the contract the essential element of a risk. This
was accomplished by the insertion in the agreement of the stipulation
that the exercise of privileges under the contract would render the
unpaid balance due and collectible. The court then construed the con-
tract as an exchange of stated value for value. The fact that the de-
fendant might receive interest on that amount of money paid in, the
size of which amount was dependent upon the longevity of the pur-
chaser, was a contingency which the court apparently failed to con-
sider. Therefore the court was not accurate in holding that there was
no risk involved. Aside from conformity to definitions, small con-
cerns like the defendant are those most needing insurance regulation
to make certain their ability to perform. Hence, the interest of the
public would have been better served if the court had adopted the
01 Home Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931),
aff'd, 285 U. S. 191, 52 Sup. Ct. 319, 76 L. ed. 695 (1932); Young v. American
Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373, 77 Atl. 623 (1910) ; cf. Southern Surety Co. v. Austin,
17 S. W. (2d) 774 (Comm. of Appeals, Tex. 1929).
= Not to be confused with burial associations. See note 17, supra.
State v. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So. 230 (1933) ; Renschler v. State, ea.
rel. Hogan, 90 Ohio St. 363, 107 N. E. 758 (1914); Lukens v. Bair Co., 104 Pa.
280, 158 Atl. 654 (1932) ; Ruto v. Italian Burial Casket Co., 104 Pa. 288, 158 Atl.
657 (1932); Sgro v. Pa. Burial Co., 113 Pa. 20, 171 AtI. 425 (1934); Sisson,
Att'y Gen. ex. rel. Nardolillo v. Prata Undertaking Co., 49 R. I. 132, 141 Atl. 76
(1929) ; State ex. rel. Fishback v. Globe Casket and Undertaking Co., 82 Wash.
124, 143 Pac. 878 (1914).
' South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 188 S. E. 529 (Ga. 1936).
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necessity of regulation test and declared that the defendant was carrying
on a business which should be regulated by insurance laws.
JOHN HUGH WILLIAMS.
Insurance-Defense of Actions--Negligence
Plaintiff, the insured, was sued by X for injuries caused by plaintiff's
negligently driven automobile. Defendant, the plaintiff's insurance com-
pany, defended the suit as required by the terms of the policy, and X
recovered a judgment considerably in excess of the amount of the policy.
Plaintiff sought to recover the difference between the amount of the
policy and the judgment recovered against him. He alleged that defend-
ant was negligent in: (1) waiving the defense of contributory negli-
gence, (2) admitting negligence on the part of the insured, (3) relying
solely upon the validity of a doubtful release obtained from the injured
party, (4) failing to settle the case before trial, or (5) for an amount
less than the policy after judgment had been entered. A directed verdict
for defendant was reversed and a new trial granted.'
Provisions in liability insurance policies requiring the insurer to
defend all suits within the protection of the policy are common. Yet,
cases alleging a negligent defense of such suits are rarely litigated. The
scarcity of this litigation can undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that
counsel employed by the insurer are usually of equal, if not higher,
calibre than those who would be employed by the insured.
The decisions are uniform in holding that an indemnity insurer
who assumes the defense of a suit against the insured is liable in dam-
ages to the insured if such defense is conducted in a negligent manner.2
Good faith alone will not satisfy the insurer's duty.3 It is said that this
duty is that of an agent to exercise reasonable care about his principal's
business.4 A comparable standard of care is imposed upon attorneys,
physicians, and other professional men.5
Cases establishing liability on the part of the insurer may be classified
as follows:
I. For a negligent failure to settle claims.0 Suppose A has indemnity
'Ballard v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Co., 86 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937).2 Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins.
Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107
Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583, 21 A. L. R. 766 (1920): Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W. (2d) 889 (1920).8 Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W.
(2d) 889 (1920).
'Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins.
Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
2 Cooley, Torts (3rd ed. 1906) 1387-1390.
o Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 79 N. H.
186, 106 Atl. 604 (1919); Douglas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (1924).
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insurance for $5,000.00 and negligently injures B who offers to settle
his claim with C insurance company for $4,500.00. It is known to C
insurance company that B has an apparently valid claim, yet C refuses
to settle for this amount. Clearly it would be much to A's advantage if
this settlement were effectuated; however, C is determined to gamble
$500 by letting the claim go to trial. B recovers a judgment for
$10,000.00. It would seem that C's conduct was reasonable and "business
like" as it affected its own interests, yet as it affected A's interests it may
have been negligent, if not bordering on bad faith. Where there is a
good chance that the claimant will recover a judgment in excess of the
amount of the policy, but offers to settle for the amount of the policy or
a little less, a refusal to settle should clearly raise a rebuttable presump-
tion that the failure to settle constituted negligence. The insured's inter-
ests should at all times be treated as paramount. It is said that the
insurer must act as would an average man under similar circumstances.7
II. For a wrongful refusal to defend as required in the policy.8
This is clearly a case of breach of contract. The damages recoverable
necessarily include the cost of trial and attorney's fees as such were part
of the insurer's undertaking.9
III. For a negligent defense when the policy provided that the
insurer defend.' 0 This is the instant case. While the case might seem
hopeless to the insurer (i.e. that the claimant is sure to recover at least
the amount of the policy) nevertheless there should be no "let up" in
the 'amount of diligence used. The interests of the insured are still at
stake, and he is relying on the insurer to protect him to its utmost ability.
By the familiar doctrine of agency the agent is required to use due care
and good faith in all negotiations affecting his principal." Where the
policy requires that the insurer either pay the amount of the policy or
defend the claim and the insurer elects to do the latter the same duty of
reasonable care in conducting the defense is imposed on the insurer3.2
The following conduct on the part of the insurer, has been deemed
negligent: (a) Failure to introduce legal evidence available which would
tend to absolve the insured of liability,' 3 (b) Promising to appeal where
"Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident and Life Assur. Corp., 79 N. H. 186,
106 Atl. 604 (1919).
'Western Indemnity Co. v. Walker-Smith Co., 203 S. W. 93 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1918).
'Pontious v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 158 Wash. 264, 290 Pac. 580 (1920).
"Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W.
(2d) 889 (1920); Schwartz v. Norwich Union Indemnity Co., 212 Wis. 593, 250
N. W. 446 (1933).
MECHEM, -UTLINES OF AGENCY (3rd ed. 1923) §§324, 325.
'Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins.
Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). Accord: Wynnewood Lumber Co. v.
The Travelers Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 946 (1917).
'Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins.
Co., 240 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
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apparent error exists but failing to do so,' 4 (c) Failure. to plead that
claimant was violating a statute when injured,1 5 (d) Agreeing to restore
a case to the docket after a nonsuit had been taken. 16
HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.
Lotteries-"Bank Nights."
The use of prize contests as a method of stimulating sales by business
concerns is nothing new and is quite legitimate. But when these schemes
lose their status as contests and take on the elements of lotteries they
become unlawful.
"Bank Night" as a scheme for advertising and increasing the attend-
ance at theatres has been widely adopted in the United States during
the past two years.2 Under the various arrangements the question when
a lottery exists has been brought to the forefront. By statute8 North
Carolina made lotteries illegal but this statute, like those of most states,
fails to define a lottery. To constitute a lottery three elements must be
present: (1) prize, (2) chance, and (3) consideration.4 There is no
question but what the first two elements are present in "Bank Night"
schemes. The difficulty arises in determining if a consideration exists in
such schemes.
Where the chances for the prize are limited to those purchasing
tickets of admission to the theatre such schemes are unanimously held
to be lotteries.5 The price paid is considered to cover both the ticket of
admission and the chance on the prize. Analogous situations are those
where merchants give free chances only to purchasers of merchandise,
and such are considered lotteries. 6
1 4McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co., 219 N. Y. 563, 114 N.
E. 114 (1916). But in the North Carolina case of Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. The
Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 N. C. 269, 91 S. E. 946 (1917) it was held that a failure
to appeal where the insurer so agreed did not of itself constitute negligence in
the absence of anything to show that the judgment was erroneous.
'Anderson v. Southern Surety Co., 107 Kan. 375, 191 Pac. 583 (1920).
'Aycock Hosiery Mills v. Maryland Casualty Co., 157 Tenn. 559, 11 S. W.
(2d) 889 (1928).
1 (1932) 45 HAR. L. REv. 1196.
'Time Magazine, February 3, 1936, p. 57; Literary Digest, March 6, 1937,
p. 36.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4428. Statute 10 and 11, Win. III, c. 17
declared lotteries illegal in England and this statute constituted part of the
common law of the United States. Most states now have statutes declaring
lotteries illegal.
'Homer v. U. S., 147 U. S. 449, 13 Sup. Ct. 409, 37 L. ed. 237 (1893); Yellow-
Stone Kit v. State, 88 Ala. 196, 7 So. 338 (1890); State v Lipkin, 169 N. C. 265,
84 S. E. 340 (1915); Brevard Manufacturing Co. v. W. Benjamin and Sons, 172
N. C. 53, 89 S. E. 797 (1916); State v. Eames, 87 N. H. 477, 183 Atl. 590 (1936).
5Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, 276 Mich.
127, 267 N. W. 602 (1936); People v. Miller, 271 N. Y. 44, 2 N. E, (2d) 38
(1936); Society Theater v. City of Seattle, 118 Wash. 258, 203 Pac. 21 (1922).
6 U. S. v. Wallis, 58 Fed. 942 (S. D. Idaho, 1893); U. S. v. Jefferson, 134 Fed.
299 (W. D. Ky., 1905) ; Davenport v. City of Ottawa, 54 Kan. 711, 39 Pac. 708
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There are two lines of authority where the chances are given to
anyone whether they purchase admission tickets or not. The first in
order to find a lottery looks to see whether the patron is required to
give something of value, some consideration directly or indirectly to the
theatre owner for a chance to participate in the drawing.7 Consideration
is defined as being money or something of value and not the technical
consideration that is sufficient to support a contract. 8 A mere benefit
to the theatre owner is insufficient. If the distribution of the free chances
is a reality then the majority of courts say no lottery exists.9 Others
view the plan as it actually works and if most of the participants buy
admission tickets and only a few take advantage of the free chances
then it is a lottery.' 0
The other line of authority, the minority, is to the effect that if there
is a pecuniary benefit to the theatre owner this is sufficient consideration.
Increase in attendance by attraction of customers to the promoter's
business constitutes sufficient consideration.A The benefit received
(1895); State v. Powell, 170 Minn. 239, 212 N. W. 169 (1927); Retail Section of
Chamber of Commerce of Platsmouth v. Kieck, 128 Neb. 13, 257 N. W. 493
(1934); Blair v. Lowham, 73 Utah 599, 276 Pac. 292 (1929). Contra: Williams
Furniture Co. v. McComb Chamber of Commerce, 147 Miss. 649, 112 So. 579
(1927).
7 People v. Cardos, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 788, 28 P. (2d) 99 (1933); State v.
Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608, 103 A. L. R. 866 (1936); State v.
Eames, 87 N. H. 477, 183 Atl. 590 (1936) ; Cross v. People, 18 Col. 321, 32 Pac.
821 (1893) (analogous plan).8 Commonwealth v. Wall, 3 N. E. (2d) 28 (Mass. 1936) ; People v. Mail and
Express Co., 179 N. Y. Supp. 640, aff'd 231 N. Y. 586, 132 N. E. 898 (1921)
(analogous plan).
People v. Cardos, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 788, 28 P. (2d) 99 (1933) (no lottery
because holders of tickets did not pay any consideration. The winner of one of
the prizes was a patron who had not purchased an admission ticket.); State v.
Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N. W. 608, 103 A. L. R. 866 (1936); State v.
Eames, 87 N. H. 477, 183 Atl. 590, 592 (1936) (Court said: "As we understand
the actual situation of this case, however, free participation is a reality. If
this is so, then regardless of the motive which induced the defendant to give
such free participation, the scheme is not within the ban of the statute.");
People v. Schafer, 289 N. Y. Supp. 649, 160 Misc. 174 (1936).
" General Theatres v. Metro-Goldwyn Distributing Corp., 9 Fed. Supp. 546(D. C. Colo. 1935) (In one month 354,000 chances were given to patrons who
purchased tickets of admission to the theatre and 180,000 were given to non-
purchasers and scheme was held to be a lottery.); Commonwealth v. Wall, 3
N. E. (2d) 28 (Mass. 1936); Glover v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N. W. 107
(1927) (where gas and oil station gave away a few chances on a prize free but
most of them were given only to customers); Featherstone v. Independent Serv-
ice Station Ass'n of Texas, 10 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. 1928) (Oil station gave
away chances on auto and actually only very few chances were given to per-
sons not making purchases; held to constitute lottery.) ; State v. Danz, 140 Wash.
546, 250 Pac. 37 (1926) (The evidence showed that by a card conspicuously placed
at the entrance to the theatre the appellants offered free tickets to the drawing
without the necessity of purchasing an admission ticket to the theatre; however,
the evidence also showed without dispute that no one ever asked for or received
the one without buying the other; held a lottery.).
I Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz, 11 Fed. Supp. 566 (S. D. Iowa, 1935);
Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enterprise, 276 Mich. 127,
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from advertising is enough.' 2 The profits made on "Bank Night" greatly
exceed those of any other night.13 Therefore can it be said that no
consideration is paid for the chances? The promoter is receiving in-
creased profits as a direct result thereof. Inferior pictures are often
shown on "Bank Night"' 4 and the price of admission could be held to
cover both admission and the chance.
It has long ago been determined that lotteries are an evil which the
law should prevent. In substance "Bank Nights", whatever their form,
are a variety of the same abuse. People are induced to part with their
money for the chance of winning a larger sum. The promoters of
"Bank Nights" expect them to. Otherwise there would be no object
in the schemes. The problem has not been presented to the North
Carolina Supreme Court, but when and if it is, it is to be hoped that
the Court will look to the substance and not the form of these transac-
tions.
JAMEs A. WELLONS, JR.
Officers-Law Enforcement-Bonds.
A statute proposed but not enacted in the recent session of the
North Carolina legislature would have required all peace officers of
every city and town in the state to be bonded.1 However, a bill was
passed requiring the bonding for faithful performance of their duties
of all members of the Highway Patrol and every other peace officer
employed by the state..' This legislation, and that attempted, was an
effort to make more adequate the remedies available to innocent persons
who are injured by police officers in the performance of their duties.
This is desirable since the duties of police officers place them in a posi-
tion where they are more likely to injure innocent parties than are
other members of the general public, and all too often the officer is
execution proof.
267 N. W. 602 (1936); Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 242 (1931),
criticized in (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 465, (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REV. 744 (chances
given to anyone attending an auction sale. Attendance of persons at sale constituted
consideration) ; Society Theatre v. City of Seattle, 118 Wash. 258, 203 Pac. 21
(1922); Willis v. Young, 1 K. B. 448 (1907) (increase in circulation of news-
paper held consideration).
See Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 579, 581 (E. D. N. Y. 1910).
'Central States Theatre Corp. v. Patz, 11 Fed. Supp. 566 (S. D. Iowa, 1935).
1' Ibid.
'S. B. No. 389, Session 1937.
Sheriffs are required to give bond for faithful performance of their duties.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3930. For a discussion of the extent of liability
on sheriff's official bond see (1934) 12 N. C. L. REv. 394. Every injured party
may sue in the name of the state the officer and his surety for any injury inflicted
by virtue of or under color of office. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §354;
Warren v. Boyd, 120 N. C. 56, 26 S. E. 700 (1897).P. L. N. C. 1937, Ch. 339. Cf. p. 342, supra.
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The municipality is free from liability for torts inflicted in the
performance of governmental functions. Law enforcement comes within
this category.2 The majority of states which allow the garnishment of
debtors prohibit the use of this remedy in the case of officers for rea-
sons of public policy and allied grounds.3 At least one city 4 has as-
sumed its "moral" obligation for injuries to private persons, incurred
in the course of law enforcement, by obtaining passage of legislation
authorizing reimbursement for injured parties. Some states have au-
thorized to a certain extent compensation in instances where persons
are injured when commandeered to aid officers.5 Provisions for com-
pensation by cities or states could be made adequate, 'but in the light
of the difficulty in obtaining the passage of such legislation, it is imprac-
tical as an immediate solution.
The remedy which appears to be most practical and to offer more
proper relief is the requirement of official bonds for all officers.6 This
means of redress is today undergoing a period of development as
evidenced by the proposed North Carolina statute. Many states at
present require the bonding only of sheriffs and constables. Some
states provide that certain cities bond their police officers for the benefit
of the public, 7 while others allow such bonding in the discretion of the
particular municipality. 8 However, the courts have, in many instances,
defeated the purpose of such bonds by strict construction of the bonds
or by strict and narrow interpretations of the statutes regarding them.9
For individuals to sue fipon the bonds where the city is named as the
ISandlin v. City of Wilmington, 185 N. C. 257, 116 S. E. 733 (1923); 6
McQuiLLix, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR'ORAIrONS (2ND ED. 1928) §2591.
'Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problem-(1936) 3 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 345, 346.
'N. Y. Local Law 13, of 1927 (authorizing the city of New York to com-
pensate persons injured by police officers while the latter are engaged in making
arrests or executing legal processes); Evans v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E.
203 (1933) ; (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 241; Borchard, Recent Statutory Developments
in Municipal Liability in Tort (1936) 2 LGAL NoTEs ON LOCAL GOV'T 89, 98;
Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort (1932) 19 VA. L. REv.
97, 118.5MIcH. LAws (Mason's Supp., 1933) §2746, 237; NEW JERSEY STAT. SERVICE
(1932) 136-1611; NEW YORK LAWS (Cahill Supp. 1931-35) §41-1848.
'Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems
(1936) 3 U. oF Cn. L. REV. 345, 349.
7 IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §49-116.
OW. VA. CODE (1931) §11; IIT. Rv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) Chap. 34, §66(9).
'Brookes v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md., 147 Md. 194, 127 Atl. 758 (1925)
(Sheriff imprisoned and tortured woman whom he suspected of knowing where-
abouts of escaped prisoner. Recovery denied against surety. Surety only liable
for official acts of officer because bond was for faithful performance of duties.
Officer here exceeded his authority. Bond is a contract and to be strictly con-
strued.); Williams v. Boles, 160 Ky. 775, 170 S. W. 170 (1914) (Recovery on
bond denied where statute did not specifically provide for liability on bond of
town marshal for policemen specially appointed by him though it did for specially
appointed deputies, and the authority of town marshal to appoint both was given
in same statutory provision.); State v. Sriver, 1 N. E. (2d) 579 (Ind. 1936)
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obligee, there must be express statutory authority.10 Recovery is de-
nied where the act of the officer is merely under color of office," as
for instance where the officer exceeded his territorial jurisdiction.' 2
Death of the officer has even been held to abate the action against the
surety.' 3  A technical irregularity in the execution of the bond has
defeated recovery.14 Some courts, though, have been more liberal and
allow recovery even though the act of the officer was not within the
technical scope of his duties.'5 Such a result is undoubtedly more sound
(Bond executed by policeman of city belonging to a class in which the police
were under control of board of public safety, payable to city and approved by
said board, for the faithful performance of duties, held to have been executed
pursuant to municipal corporation act and hence not subject to general statutes
covering official bonds. Suit was for an assault committed by officer while on
duty.).
Sunter v. Fraser, 194 Cal. 337, 228 Pac. 660 (1924) ; Martin v. Magee, 179
La. 913, 155 So. 433 (1934) (La. had such a statute.) ; City of Eaton Rapids v.
Stump, 127 Mich. 1, 86 N. W. 438 (1901); Carr v. City of Knoxville, 144 Tenn.
483, 234 S. W. 328 (1921); U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Crittenden, 62
Tex. Civ. App. 283, 131 S. W. 232 (1910) ; cf. Cushing v. Lickert, 79 Neb. 384,
112 N. W. 616 (1907) (recovery allowed only on bonds required by law unless
specifically given right to sue on others by statute).
'Taylor v. Shields, 183 Ky. 669, 210 S. W. 168 (1919) (unlawful arrest);
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. White, 209 Ky. 402, 272 S. W. 902 (1925)
(false arrest) ; Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Bonta, 217 Ky. 265, 289
S. W. 231 (1926) (unlawful arrest and assault); Young v. Amis, 220 Ky. 484,
295 S. W. 431 (1927) (unlawful arrest and later killing to prevent escape);
Reed v. Philpott's Adm'r, 235 Ky. 429, 31 S. W. (2d) 339 (1930) (Deceased,
an officer, had prisoner under arrest. Defendant, an officer, tried to take prisoner
from deceased, and arrest him as 'his own prisoner, and in the affray shot de-
ceased. Court held that defendant exceeded his authority. Surety not liable.) ;
Shelton v. Nat. Surety Co. of N. Y., 235 Ky. 778, 32 S. W. (2d) 339 (1930) (un-
lawful arrest and search); Goins v. Hudson, 246 Ky. 517, 55 S. W. (2d) 388
(1932) (jailer unlawfully imprisoned plaintiff).
Brittain v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 219 Ky. 465, 293 S. W. 956
(1927) (Street was city limits. Officer shot plaintiff in attempting to make an
arrest in house situated on side of street which was outside city limits.)
I Veatch v. Derrick, 224 Ky. 332, 6 S. W. (2d) 279 (1928) ; Jonas v. Taylor,
166 Wash. 302 6 P. (2d) 615 (1932).
'Finney v. Shannon, 166 Wash. 28, 6 P. (2d) 360 (1931) (city council had
not properly voted on requiring the execution of the bond).
" Burge v. Scarbrough, 211 Ala. 377, 100 So. 653 (1924) (assault and battery
in making arrest) ; Ingram v. Evans, 227 Ala. 14, 148 So. 593 (1933); Gomez
v. Scanlan, 155 Cal. 528, 102 Pac. 12 (1909) (false arrest and imprisonment);
Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P. (2d) 957 (1934) (officer, while attempt-
ing to arrest deceased unlawfully, shot and killed him) ; City of Cairo v. Sheehan,
173 Ill. App. 464 (1912) (wrongfully assaulting man under arrest); Scott v.
Feilschmidt, 191 Iowa 347, 182 N. W. 382 (1921) (officer without cause arrested
and insulted girl in public on charge of immorality); Haack v. Pollei, 134 Minn.
78, 158 N. W. 908 (1916) (officer without justification shot man under arrest
when he attempted to run); Lee v. Charmley, 20 N. D. 570, 129 N. W. 448 (1910)
(false arrest) ; Santora v. Callan, 18 Ohio App. 92 (1924) (officer, off duty and
not in uniform, was intoxicated and shot innocent bystander while attempting to
make an unjustifiable arrest. Surety was held liable for acts under color of
office, therefore if officer was pretending to act as an official it was color of
office.); Burkeland v. Bliss, 62 S. D. 91, 252 N. W. 25 (1933); Riter v. Neatherly,
157 S. W. 439 (Tex. 1913) (unlawful arrest); Branch v. Guinn, 242 S. W.
482 (Tex. 1922) (false arrest and imprisonment); Jackson v Harries, 65
Utah, 282, 236 Pac. 234 (1925) (Unlawful search of home. Test of liabil-
ity of surety is whether official would have acted if he had not been an
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because if the acts outside the scope of an officer's duties are not in-
cluded the bond is useless to members of the public wrongfully injured,
because it is not the duty of police to injure persons wrongfully.
The real solution of the problem can be effected by proper legisla-
tion regarding bonding. In order to obviate judicial strictness of interpre-
tation, both the statutes and the bonds should be carefully and minutely
drawn. Each must be worded with respect to the other. Every law
enforcement officer, capable of making an arrest, should be required
to give a bond for the benefit of any person injured by the officer in the
execution of official acts or those under color of office. What then
shall be the extent of liability on the bond? Consideration must be
given the various interests involved, which are those of the individual,
the officer and the general public. Since the latter are the most im-
portant, the liability on the bond should not be so broad as to paralyze
law enforcement. In many instances the officer must act quickly in
making arrests, and he cannot stop to weigh responsibilities. There-
fore to allow recovery on the bond for every technically irregular arrest
would require officers to spend a large part of their time defending minor
suits; as a consequence officers would act only when sure as to the
guilt of the individual, and law enforcement would be retarded. Con-
sequently, liability on the bond should be limited to damages for actual-
injuries or extended false imprisonment.
The cost of these bonds should be borne by the governmental unit
hiring the officer because the bonds are primarily for the general public
good. Additional reasons are economy, expediency, prevention of
lapses, and certainty of existence of the bond.
Where the surety has paid for a wilfull or grossly negligent injury
a cause of action by the surety against the officer should be allowed to
restrain the officer from becoming excessively careless and high-handed
in his acts.
W. C. HOLT.
officer); Town of Mabscott v. Saunders, 114 W. Va. 196, 171 S. E. 410
(1933) (officer negligently shot plaintiff); Village of Barboursville v. Taylor,
115 W. Va. 4, 174 S. E. 485 (1934) (Officer in making arrest fired tear gas gun
near face of prisoner and severely injured him. Case remanded on other grounds
than liability of surety.); City of Princeton v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of
N. Y., 188 S. E. 757 (W. Va. 1936) (unlawful shooting to prevent escape of
prisoner); 19 A. L. R. 73. Accord: Hodge v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
42 Ga. App. 84, 155 S. E. 95 (1930) (Approved rule allowing recovery where
act is under color of office, but held that where deceased was shot by officer
while engaging in a purely personal affray with the officer this was not in any
way connected with his office.).
Recovery allowed on bond for "faithful performance of duties" where officer
negligently operated a motor vehicle causing the damage. Manwaring v. Geisler,
191 Ky. 53Z 230 S. W. 918 (1921); National Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Hester's
Adm'r, 241 Ky. 623, 44 S. W. (2d) 563 (1931) ; Curnyn v. Kinney, 119 Neb. 478,
229 N. W. 894 (1930) ; U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Samuels, 116 Ohio St.
586, 157 N. E. 325 (1927).
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Sales-Torts-Foreign Matter in Food.
Plaintiff ordered ice cream in defendant drug store. It was scooped
out and served to him on a plate and he was injured by glass imbedded
in it. He sued both the manufacturer of the ice cream and the drug
store. Held: nonsuit as to the drug store reversed, the court saying
that it was under duty to exercise ordinary care to see that the ice cream
was free from deleterious foreign matter, even though it was proved
that the glass was in the ice cream when it was sold to the druggist by
the manufacturer.'
When one is injured by eating food containing harmful foreign
matter, he may have either of two grounds for recovery: (1) tort action
for negligence,2 or (2) contract action for breach of implied warranty.
In the tort action, the plaintiff consumer must of course prove the
negligence of the defendant, whether he be a manufacturer, retail dealer
or restaurant keeper. Some courts hold that proof of injury and the
presence of deleterious matter raises a prima facie case of negligence. 3
'Crowley v. Lane Drug Stores, 189 S. E. 380 (Ga. 1936).In some cases the plaintiff, unable to show actual negligence, has recovered
for the defendant's violation of a pure food statute, such violation being held to
constitute actionable negligence as a matter of law. Meshbesher v. Channellene
Oil and Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N. W. 428 (1909) ; Kelley v. Daily, 56 Mont.
63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919); see Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N. C.
33, 34, 87 S. E. 958, 959 (1916). N. C. COD ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4751 pro-
vides that "No person, firm, or corporation, by himself or agent, shall manufac-
ture, sell, expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, any article
of food, drug, confectionery or liquor which is adulterated or misbranded. .. ."3 Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155 (1924) (arsenate of
lead in flour); Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64
So. 791 (1914) (mouse in coca-cola) ; Freeman v. Schults Bread Co., 100 Misc.
528, 163 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1916) (nail imbedded in bread); Pillars v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 500, 78 So. 365, 366 (1918) (decomposed
human toe in chewing tobacco, the court saying "we can imagine no reason why,
with ordinary care, human toes could not be left out of chewing tobacco . .. and
it seems to us that somebody has been very careless.") ; Copeland v. Curtis, 36 Ga.
App. 288, 136 S. E. 324 (1926). In the last-mentioned case the court said: "While
negligence on the part of the defendant must be alleged and proved, where plaintiff
establishes the unwholesome quality of the food, with injury from its consumption,
-these facts in themselves would sufficiently speak of defendant's negligence to
make a prima facie case; and, until defendant is exonerated, the jury would be
authorized to apply the maxim res ipsa loquitur, and to find such issue in favor
of plaintiff."
Contra: Horn and Hardart Baking Co. v. Lieber, 25 F. (2d) 449, 28 N. C. C. A.
189 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1928) (tack in dish of strawberries); Ash v. Childs Dining
Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86, 120 N. E. 396, 4 A. L. R. 1559 (1918) (tack in blueberry
-pie made and sold by defendant, court refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur on the
ground that it was just as likely that the tack became imbedded in one of
-the berries before the defendant received them) ; O'Brien v. Liggett Co., 255
Mass. 553, 152 N. E. 57, 47 A. L. R. 148 (1926) (glass in strawberry short-
-cake); Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1916) (where nail was con-
,cealed in cake, held, res ipsa did not apply because the nail was obviously not used
in mixing the dough nor in connection with the other ingredients of the cake,
-but was apparently dropped into the dough carelessly or wilfully by one of the
,defendant's servants or an outsider) ; Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon,
132 Tenn. 419, 178 S. W. 1009, L. R. A. 1916A 179 (1915) (bug in chewing
-tobacco).
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This is the better view, as the plaintiff would usually have considerable
difficulty in proving what the defendant's actual negligence was. In
this connection the courts apparently make no distinction between suits
against a manufacturer, retail dealer and restaurant keeper, except in
the case of a retail dealer who purchased the food from a reputable
dealer and sold it in the original package. There is no presumption of
negligence on the part of the retailer in such a case, since he could not
be expected to open for inspection the individual packages.4
There is some dispute among the authorities as to the validity of the
doctrine of implied warranty when one is injured by food containing
foreign matter. When the defendant is a manufacturer of food sold
to the consumer by a retailer, the trend favors the application of the
doctrine, in spite of the lack of contractual relation between the man-
ufacturer and the consumer.5 Likewise, the doctrine applies generally
in a suit against a retailer.6 But when the retailer sells goods in the
original package, the majority view, in those states not having the
Uniform Sales Act, is that he cannot be held on implied warranty, since
he has no means of knowing the condition of the package's contents. 7
Under the Uniform Sales Act,8 a warranty is implied, if the buyer relies
on the retailer's judgment instead of asking for a particular brand.9
When the defendant is a restaurant keeper, an interesting problem arises.
Some cases'0 have held the transaction to be a service rather than a sale
'Fleetwood v. Swift and Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, 108 S. E. 909 (1921) (decom-
posed rat's head in butter).
'Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P. (2d) 162 (1933) ; Cudahy Packing
Co. v. Baskin, 170 Miss. 834, 155 So. 217 (1934).
'Heinemann v. Barfield, 136 Ark. 500, 207 S. W. 62 (1918); Wiedemann v.
Wheeler, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N. E. 210 (1897).
1 Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933) ; Julian
v. Laubenberger, 16 Misc. 646, 38 N. Y. Supp. 1052 (1896) ; Pennington v. Cran-
berry Fuel Co., 186 S. E. 610 (W. Va. 1936); Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636,
638, 269 S. W. 743, 744 (1925), in which the court said: "Neither seller nor pur-
chaser can otherwise judge of its condition (canned goods) and in this respect
both stand upon equal footing. So that . . . where the article is one of general
use and put up -by a reputable manufacturer or packer in a sealed can, the ex-
terior of which is in good condition, the retailer is not responsible to his customer
for defective or unwholesome condition of the contents unless and except at the
time of the sale he expressly warrants the same to -be free from defects." Contra:
Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 Ill. App. 117 (1913); Sloan v. Woolworth Co., 193
Ill. App. 620 (1915).
'Section 15, subsection (1) "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
'Burkhardt v. Armour and Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385, 90 A. L. R. 1269(1932); Bowman v. Woodway Stores, 258 Ill. App. 307 (1930); Ward v. Great
A. and P. Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225, 5 A. L. R. 248 (1918) ; Griffin v.
Butler Grocery Co., 108 N. J. 92, 156 AtI. 636 (1931). Contra: Aronowitz v.
Woolworth Co., 134 Misc. 272, 236 N. Y. Supp. 133 (1929).
" Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) ; Nisky v. Childs Co.,
103 N. J. 464, 135 Atl. 805 (1927).
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and hence that there is no implied warranty."' However, a number of
courts have leaped this technical barrier and have raised an implied
warranty, because of the high regard the law has for human life.1 2
Where the Uniform Sales Act is in effect, the restaurateur has been
held on implied warranty, since the transaction amounts to a sale under
this statute and the purchaser clearly relies on the restaurateur's judg-
ment.13
The doctrine of implied warranty seems rather harsh, especially in
the case of goods in cans or packages, in that it makes the retailer or
restaurateur an absolute insurer of the quality of his food, he being
liable though not at fault. The courts are naturally anxious to protect
the unfortunate consumer; but it would not be necessary for them to
resort to this often unfair doctrine if they would instead apply ras ipsa
loquitur in tort actions. This course would seem justifiable in that the
purchaser has little chance of proving negligence, not being in pos-
session of the facts. With canned food, the burden under the res ipsa
doctrine would be placed not on the retailer but on the manufacturer,
where it should be.
North Carolina shows little sympathy toward one injured by con-
suming food which contains impurities. With the minority, it refuses
to apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in a suit against the manufac-
turer.14 The plaintiff is not required to produce direct proof of neg-
ligence; he may prove his case by other relevant facts from which
actionable negligence may be inferred.15 But in showing that like
products manufactured by the defendant contained deleterious sub-
stances, the plaintiff must prove that they were manufactured (1) under
substantially similar conditions,' 6 (2) at approximately the same time,"
and (3) that the deleterious substances were of the same nature.' 8
"The argument in these cases is based on the holding in Parker v. Flint, 12
Mod. 254, 88 Eng. Rep. 1303 (1701) that an innkeeper "does not sell but utters his
provision"; and on BEALE, INNIKEEPERS (1906) §302, where it is said that "an
innkeeper is not an 'insurer' of the quality of the food that he serves but would be
liable for knowingly or negligently furnishing bad or deleterious food."
'-Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407 (1918); Race
v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853, L. R. A. 1918F 1172 (1918) ; Temple v.
Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924).
"Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 49 P. (2d) 286 (Calif. 1935), affirmed on ap-
peal, 6 Calif. (2d) 674, 59 P. (2d) 142 (1936); Schuler v. Union News Co.,
4 N. E. (2d) 465 (Mass. 1936).
Blackwell v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N. C. 751, 182 S. E. 469 (1935).
Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N. C. 623, 169 S. E. 194 (1933) ; Hampton v. Bot-
tling Co., 208 N. C. 331, 180 S. E. 584 (1935); Enloe v. Bottling Co., 208 N. C.
305, 180 §. E. 582 (1935).
"Enloe v. Bottling Co., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S. E. 582 (1935).
17 Collins v. Lumberton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 209 N. C. 821, 184 S. E. 834
(1936) (Admission of evidence that others had found foreign substances in coca-
colas manufactured by defendant was -held error since there was no evidence of
the time when the manufacturer sold the other bottles to dealers.).
'Enloe v. Bottling Co., 208 N. C. 305, 180 S. E. 582 (1935) (Where plaintiff
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In Ward v. Sea Food Co.,19 where the defendant was a manufac-
turer who sold through a retailer, Chief Justice Clark stated that "the
authorities are numerous that there is an implied warranty that runs
with the sale of food for human consumption, that it is fit for food and
not dangerous or deleterious." Yet the court in Thomason v. Ballard
and Ballard Co.20 pointed out that the decision in the Ward case was
grounded on negligence, and held that there was no implied warranty
on the part of a manufacturer who sells his products through a retailer,
since there was no contractual relation between the manufacturer and
the consumer. 2 ' However, Poovey v. Sugar Co.2 2 held that there was
an implied warranty where the defendant manufactured and himself
sold to the consumer. There have been no North Carolina cases where
a manufacturer sold to a consumer through a retailer and suit was
brought against the retailer. From the holdings in the three cases just
mentioned, it would seem that recovery might be had against the re-
tailer on implied warranty. This would lead to an undesirable result
in that the retailer, who in most cases is not at fault, would suffer. Or
if the retailer were allowed to recover from the manufacturer, there
would be needless circuity of action.
The decision in the principal case is questionable.23 The same rea-
son that acquits the retailer where the food is sold in the original pack-
age-that is, he is not expected to open the package and is not in a
position to discover the danger 2 4 --would seem to apply where glass is
imbedded in ice cream. Though the courts should be diligent in seeing
that the consumer is protected, this should not be at the expense of an
innocent retail dealer. True, it is somewhat doubtful if the plaintiff
will be able to prove the manufacturer's negligence 2 5 It may have
been the realization of this fact that moved the court to reverse the
nonsuit judgment and give the plaintiff a shot at the retailer as well as
was injured by rat in coca-cola, evidence of glass found in another coca-cola
manufactured by defendant was held improperly admitted.).
"171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916). " 208 N. C. 1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935).
"Clarkson, J., dissented vigorously, pointing out that the weight of authority
is opposed to the view taken by the majority of the court. 26 C. J. 785; 11 R. C. L.1122.1 191 N. C. 722, 133 S. E. 12 (1926).
'In a comparable case, Sheehan v. Menkes, 8 Misc. 867, 152 AtL 326 (N. J.
1930), where defendant manufacturer sold mincemeat to defendant retailer
who made pie out of it and served it to plaintiff who broke a tooth on an iron
-bolt in the pie, the manufacturer only was held liable when the retailer, by show-
ing his own due care, proved facts from which it reasonably appeared that the
bolt was in the mincemeat when the manufacturer sold it to him. The principal
case presents an even stronger situation favoring a decision for the retailer, since
glass in a solid lump of ice cream would be more difficult to discover than an iron
bolt in mincemeat out of which pie 'was made.
' Howard v. Jacob's Pharmacy Co., 189 S. E. 373 (Ga. 1937) (worms in pat-
ent medicine).
'Judgment of nonsuit as to the manufacturer also was reversed.
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the manufacturer. But rather than bearing down on the retailer, it is
submitted that a more equitable result would be reached by application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against the manufacturer.
CHARLES AYcocx POE.
Usury-Insurance-Life Insurance as Condition
Precedent to Loan.
A North Carolina statute, enacted in 1915, provides that an insur-
ance company, as a condition precedent to lending money, and in addi-
tion to other collateral, may require the borrower to take out an insur-
ance policy with the company on his own life, or that of another, and
deposit such policy as collateral with the company.1 A recent North
Carolina case held that the statute was not unconstitutional as being
violative of §7 Article I of the Constitution of North Carolina, which
provides, "No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of
public services." 2
The court admits that the statute is unconstitutional if its effect "is
to exempt insurance companies from the provision of" the usury stat-
utes. The holding that the statute does not so exempt insurance com-
panies reverses decisions made prior to the enactment of the statute
that it was usurious to require a borrower to insure with the company
as a condition precedent to making the loan.8 The federal courts hold
that such a transaction is usurious.4
It is uniformly stated by the courts that if an insurance company,
with the purpose of evading the usury statutes, requires a borrower
to take a policy with the lender company, merely as a device to conceal
its usurious nature, the transaction is nevertheless usurious.5 It is
difficult to understand how the courts determine that a guilty intent is
lacking in most cases where the point under discussion is involved. Why
should an insurance company require a policy as a condition precedent,
if it does not seek a profit in addition to the maximum rate of interest
allowed by law? It is well known that insurance companies do not
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6291.
-Cowan v. Security Life and Trust Co., 211 N. C. 18, 188 S. E. 812 (1936).
'Roberts v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 118 N. C. 429, 24 S. E. 780 (1896);
Miller v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 118 N. C. 612, 24 S. E. 484 (1896) ; Carter v.
Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 122 N. C. 338, 30 S. E. 341 (1898).
'Moore v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 9, 777 (C. C. D. Neb.
1876); Missouri Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Kittle, 2 Fed. 113 (C. C. D. Neb. 1880);
National Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 7 Fed. 805 (C. C. D. Iowa, 1881); Brower v.
Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 86 Fed. 748 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1898); see Brown V.
Fletcher, 244 Fed. 854 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1917), aff'd, 253 Fed. 15 (C. C. A.
2nd, 1918).
'John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 55 How. Prac. 393 (N. Y.
1878.)
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lend a greater amount on a policy than the cash surrender value of that
policy. Usually an insurance policy has no cash surrender value until
it has been in effect for some three years. Hence, to say that a policy
bought at the time that the loan was made is required as collateral is to
put an argument that will not hold water. Of course, in the event of
the insured's death during the term of the loan, the debt would be paid
out of the insurance, but the insurance company requires ample security
in addition to the policy. Six states hold that in the absence of proof
of actual intent to evade the statute the transaction is not usurious. 6
These decisions are generally based on the argument that the insurance
company gives protection in exchange for the premiums, and therefore
the borrower-insured gets value for value. Where -the borrower is
allowed to deposit a policy taken out with another company, it is clearly
not usurious, because the lender has no interest in the premiums which
are paid to keep the policy in force.7
Only one other statute similar to the North Carolina statute has
been found. 8  Its constitutionality has not yet been passed upon. A
somewhat analagous situation exists where states have, to varying ex-
tents, exempted building and loan associations from usury laws, by
permitting them to take premiums, fines, etc., in addition to the max-
imum legal rates of interest. 9 The borrowers are generally required to
'Craig v. McMullin, 39 Ky. 311 (1840) (A free negro, desiring to free his
son, borrowed money to -purchase the boy, agreeing to pay ten per cent interest,
and an additional ten per cent per year for the risk the lender would bear of the
'boy's dying before he was paid for by his father. The stipulation for ten per cent
for insurance was held not to be usurious.) ; Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Pater-
son Silk Manufacturing Co., 25 N. J. Eq. 160 (1874) ; -Iomeopathic Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Crane, 25 N. J. Eq. 418 (1874); Stitch v. Samek, 19 Misc. 534
43 N. Y. Supp. 1068 (1897) (A pawnbroker made an extra charge in addition to
the maximum legal rate of interest, for insuring the property against dust and
moths. Held, not usurious.); New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Donaldson, 3 Edw. Ch.
199 (N. Y. 1838); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 55 How.
Prac. 393 (N. Y. 1878); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 63 Ohio St.
478, 59 N. E. 230, 53 L. R. A. 462 (1900) (borrower was required to insure the
life of his grandson); Heaberlin v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 114
W. Va. 198, 171 S. E. 419 (1933); see Niles v. Kavanagh, 179 Cal. 98, 175 Pac.
462 (1918).
' See Sledd v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 359, 183 S. E. 199 (1935). In
this case the court points out that the borrower would have been permitted to take
out insurance with "any reputable company," but the policy was actually taken out
with the lender.8 Ky. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1936) §2219a.9 ALA. Con ANN. (Michie, 1928) §7107, "The premium to be charged upon
any loan must be fixed by the by-laws, but such premium and the interest on the
loan taken together shall not exceed one per cent per month on the amount ac-
tually lent or advanced." The maximum legal rate of interest in Alabama i;
eight per cent. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §8563; Aasz. REv. CODE ANN.(Struckmeyer, 1928) §619; COLO. ANN. STAT. (Michie, 1935) Vol. 2c.5 §14(17);
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §4017(3); DE. Rxv. COD (1935) §2339; DisT. OF Cos.
CODE (1930). §46; FLA. COmp. GEN. LAws ANN. (1927) §6165; GA. CODE ANN.(Harrison, 1933) §16-210; Ky. STAT. (Baldwin, 1936) §865a (impliedly grants per-
mission to charge premium in addition to the legal rate of interest) ; MD. CODE
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be members of the association, and are not allowed to borrow more than
a certain percentage of the amount represented by their stock. These
statutes are generally held constitutional.1 0 It seems that this practice,
but for the statutes, clearly would be usurious. But since the rule against
usury is purely of statutory origin, it follows that the definition of usury
can be changed by the legislatures.
Granting the constitutionality of the North Carolina statute, there
remains the question of its advisability. A possible argument in favor
of the North Carolina statute, from the standpoint of public policy, is
that the statute enables insurance companies to increase their business,
and to become increasingly prosperous financially. It is desirable that
through the medium of insurance, risks of various sorts be spread out
over the general public. Hence, broadly stated, where the insurance
company benefits, the public benefits through better and cheaper insur-
ance protection. The validity of this argument is open to question.11
On the other hand is found the policy back of usury statutes. It
is desirable to protect the person in straitened circumstances, with poor
bargaining power, as against the lender who, of course, generally has
the superior bargaining power. One can only speculate as to the pur-
pose of the North Carolina statute. It probably was passed exclusively
for the benefit of the insurance companies. Little benefit results to the
borrower when he is forced to buy insurance which he may not need,
can not afford, and would not buy if he were not pressed for money.
Still less benefit accrues to the borrower where he is required to insure
the life of a third person, with the insurance company as beneficiary,
ANN. (Bagby, 1924) art. 23 §164; MINN. STAT. ANN. (Mason, 1927) §7754; Miss.
CODE ANN. (1930) §3986 (Permits building and loan associations to charge ten
per cent on loans to members. Otherwise the legal rate is lower.) ; Nan. ComP.
STAT. (1929) §8-315; N. Y. CON. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) Ch. 3 §378(3); ORE. CODE
ANN. (1930) §25-308; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §3900, "The premiums
bid by borrowing stockholders for the preference or priority of a loan shall be
paid before the loan is consummated, not as a part of the loan, not as interest, but
as a means of determining which one of the shareholders shall receive the loan."
"Linton v. Fulton Building and Loan Ass'n, 262 Ky. 198, 90 S. W. (2d) 22(1936); Livingston Loan and Building Ass'n v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 68
N. W. 375 (1896). In view of the constitutional provision quoted in the text,
what would North Carolina hold as to the constitutionality of a statute specifically
exempting building and loan associations from the usury statute? North Carolina
appears to have no such statutory exemption.
"Another argument advanced in favor of the statute is that where a fraternity
or other similar organization borrows money fron an insurance company, an easy
method of collecting the debt is established in the following way. Several mcm-
bers of the fraternity are persuaded to buy participating policies of life insurance,
and the lender company is named beneficiary to the extent of each member's. pro-
portionate share of the indebtedness. The policyholders pay regular premiums and
each dividend paid by the company is applied to the indebtedness until it is paid
off. But this method is apt to be an expensive way of collecting, in so far as the
members of the fraternity are concerned. Also, unless the policies are allowed to
be taken out with a company other than the lender, the transaction is usurious
in spirit and should not, therefore, be allowed.
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which requirement the North Carolina statute would permit an insur-
ance company to make. Often the borrower, as the insurance company
well knows, does not intend to continue paying the premiums after, re-
payment of the loan. In other words, he buys insurance, not for his
own protection, but simply because he is forced to do so. Therefore,
by strict analysis, the insurance company gets, in addition to the legal
rate of interest, extra business, a bonus as it were, that the company
would not ordinarily get. Such transactions should .therefore be dis-
couraged as violating the purpose, if not the letter, of the usury statutes.
JAMES M. VERNER.
